Reforms in the Business and Operating Manner of the Ohio Courts of Appeals by Parness, Jeffrey A. & Reagle, Jack E.
The University of Akron
IdeaExchange@UAkron
Akron Law Review Akron Law Journals
July 2015
Reforms in the Business and Operating Manner of
the Ohio Courts of Appeals
Jeffrey A. Parness
Jack E. Reagle
Please take a moment to share how this work helps you through this survey. Your feedback will be
important as we plan further development of our repository.
Follow this and additional works at: https://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview
Part of the Litigation Commons, and the State and Local Government Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Akron Law Journals at IdeaExchange@UAkron, the
institutional repository of The University of Akron in Akron, Ohio, USA. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Akron Law Review by an authorized administrator of IdeaExchange@UAkron. For more information, please
contact mjon@uakron.edu, uapress@uakron.edu.
Recommended Citation
Parness, Jeffrey A. and Reagle, Jack E. (1983) "Reforms in the Business and Operating Manner of the Ohio Courts
of Appeals," Akron Law Review: Vol. 16 : Iss. 1 , Article 2.
Available at: https://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol16/iss1/2
REFORMS IN THE BUSINESS AND OPERATING MANNER OF
THE OHIO COURTS OF APPEALS
by
JEFFREY A. PARNESS* AND JACK E. REAGLE**
I. INTRODUCTION
L IKE INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE courts in many other American
judicial systems, the Ohio courts of appeals provide the avenue for review
of trial court decisions for nearly all Ohio litigants. And, as in many other
American judicial systems, these courts are in the midst of a growing crisis caused
by increased case filings unaccompanied by sufficient increases in state support.
In the next few years, the Ohio courts of appeals will be compelled to develop
new methods of performing their appellate review tasks simply to stay afloat.
Necessity has already prompted intermediate appellate courts outside Ohio
to explore new techniques for handling caseload pressures. While some of these
techniques have proven quite successful, others can at best be characterized
only as noble experiments. In seeking ways to cope with their caseload crisis,
the Ohio courts will be able to draw upon these experiences.
This article will review, and comment upon, some of the techniques
available to the Ohio appeals courts. The task of preparing this article was
facilitated greatly by the many Ohio appeals court judges who responded to
a survey letter, reproduced in the appendix, sent by the authors in the Summer
of 1981. The results of this survey are incorporated in the following pages, though
we are confident they do not represent the judges' last words. To promote further
dialogue, we have deleted references to the names of the particular judges whose
remarks are noted, and have instead assigned each judge an identifying number.
This work contains three major sections. First, the article demonstrates
the need for some reform in the Ohio courts of appeals. Second, reforms in
the business of the Ohio courts of appeals are suggested. Such reforms would
alter the longstanding policy of "one trial, one review" by making certain
appellate jurisdiction subject to the appellate courts' discretion. Third, possible
reforms in the operating manner of the Ohio appeals courts are examined. This
section is divided into three significant parts, which discuss possible reforms
during the prehearing, hearing, and posthearing stages of an appeal. While the
views expressed within this article are at times tentative, hopefully they will
nonetheless be found worthy of consideration and in some small way aid the
*Associate Professor of Law, University of Akron; B.A., Colby College; J.D., University of Chicago.
**B.A., Edinboro State College; J.D., University of Akron.
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courts of appeals in discovering ways to cope with the growing crisis.
II. THE OHIO COURTS OF APPEALS: THE NEED FOR REFORM
A. Subject-Matter Jurisdiction
The present Ohio courts of appeals originated with the district court
established under the state constitution of 1851,' though their contemporary
form seemingly first appeared with the 1883 amendments to that organic law.
The district court was given "like original jurisdiction with the supreme court,
and such appellate jurisdiction as may be provided by law,"I but this jurisdiction
was transferred to the new circuit court created in 1883.1 Unlike the district
court, which was "composed of the judges of the court of common pleas of
the respective districts, and one of the judges of the supreme court,"" the circuit
court "was presided over by judges elected to serve on that court." 5
Courts of appeals were created in 1912 when constitutional change placed
judges of the circuit court in the courts of appeals. 6 The new appeals courts
had original jurisdiction similar to that of the supreme court' and appellate
jurisdiction as may be provided by law. 8 Yet, unlike either the earlier district
or circuit court, the courts of appeals possessed constitutionally mandated ap-
pellate jurisdiction over "the trial of chancery cases." " The new courts of ap-
peals were to operate in eight "appellate districts of compact territory bound-
ed by county lines," and each was to include three judges."' Since 1912, the
number of appellate districts has gradually risen so that there are now twelve
districts" and the appellate jurisdiction in the trial of chancery cases has been
eliminated.'2
'The creation of the district court has been characterized as "the first attempt in Ohio to create an in-
termediate reviewing court." Skeel, Constitutional History of Ohio Appellate Courts, 6 CLEVE.-MAR. L.
REV. 323, 325 (1957).
'OHIO CONST. art. IV, § 6.
'OHIO CONST. art. IV, § 6 (1851, amended 1883).
'OHIO CONST. art. IV, § 5.
'Skeel, supra note 1, at 327.
'OHIO CONST. art. IV, § 6 (1851, amended 1912).
'OHIO CONST. art. IV, §§ 2,6 (1851, amended 1912).
'OHIO CONST. art. IV, § 6 (1851, amended 1912).
UId.
,Old.
"OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2501.01 (Baldwin 1981). In 1912, the appellate districts constituted the circuits
in which the circuit courts had been held until then, OHIO CONST. art. IV, § 6 (1851, amended 1912), and
numbered eight, 84 LAWS OF OHIO 240, § 1 (1887), though there had originally been only seven circuits, 81
LAWS OF OHIO 168, § 1 (1884) and 82 LAWS OF OHIO 19-20, § 2 (1885). The number of appellate districts
increased to nine in 1921, 109 LAWS OF OHIO 88, 89, § 1 (1921); to ten in 1955, 126 LAWS OF OHIO 420-21,
§ 1 (1955); to eleven in 1968, 132 LAWS OF OHIO 2507, § 1 (Part 11-I1 1968); and to twelve in 1980, 1980
S. 13, eff. 7-25-80. For an historicalperspective on the present districts, see S. HARRIS. APPELLATE COURTS
AND APPELLATE PROCEDURE IN OHIO 56-63 (1933).
"Compare OHIO CONST. art. IV,'§ 6 (1851, amended 1912) with OHIO CONST. art. IV, § 6 (1951, amended
1944), OHIO CONST. art. IV, § 6 (1851, amended 1959) and OHIO CONST. art. IV, § 3 (B)(2)(adopted May
7, 1968).
2
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REFORMS IN OHIO COURTS OF APPEALS
In many ways the constitutional underpinnings of the Ohio courts of ap-
peals' current jurisdictional authority are similar to those of the United States
Supreme Court. Each court is mandated to possess original jurisdiction in cer-
tain types of cases, I3 and such trial authority seemingly is both nonexclusive'"
and immunized from legislative alteration. 5 Further, each court apparently has
only such appellate jurisdiction as is legislatively established. 6
Statutory provisions on the appellate jurisdiction of Ohio appeals courts
are, however, quite different from those relevant to the United States Supreme
Court. The general statutory grant of appellate jurisdictional authority to the
Ohio courts of appeals indicates these courts "shall" have jurisdiction "upon
an appeal upon questions of law to review ... orders of courts of record in-
ferior to the courts of appeals within the district ... for prejudicial error com-
mitted by such lower court." ' 7 The statute also indicates that review is ap-
propriate on questions of fact in certain classes of actions upon appeal.' 8 Ef-
fectively, every case in an Ohio court of record is eligible for the courts of ap-
peals, thereby establishing a right to have reviewed each trial proceeding. In
contrast, the United States Supreme Court possesses mandatory appellatejurisdiciton in only selected cases, with discretionary review available in other
cases. '9 Not surprisingly, the United States courts of appeals possess statutory
appellate jurisdictional authority similar to that of their Ohio counterpart,20
though comparable federal constitutional underpinnings are absent.2'
Because the Ohio General Assembly has continued to recognize the need
for several general trial courts,22 there is a variety of sources from which ap-
"See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 2; OHIO CONST. art. IV, § 3(B)(1).
"The Ohio Court of Appeals possesses original jurisdiction over cases also subject to Ohio Supreme Court's
original jurisdictional authority, OHIO CONST. art. IV, §§ 2(B)(l)(a)-(f) and 3(B)(1)(a)-(f), while much ofthe U.S. Supreme Court's original jurisdictional authority parallels that of the federal district court, Il-
linois v. Milwaukee, 406 U.S. 91 (1972).
"Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137 (1803); State ex rel. Pressley v. Industrial Comm., 11 Ohio St. 2d 141(1973).
"See U.S. CONST. art. In, § 2, cl. 2; OHIO CONST. art. IV, § 3(B)(2).
"OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2501.02 (Baldwin 1978).
'Id. But see OHIO R. App. P. 2; A. WHITESIDE, OHIO APPELLATE PRACTICE § 1.17 (1981). The statutoryprovision on review of questions of law and fact may serve as only a reminder that no de novo review
of facts is now available in the Ohio courts of appeals.
"Compare 28 U.S.C. §§ 1254(2), 1257(1) and (2), 1258(1) and (2), (mandatory review "by appeal") with28 U.S.C. §§ 1254(l), 1255(1), 1256, 1257(3), 1258(3) (discretionary review "by writ of certiorari"). Thedividing line between mandatory and discretionary appellate jurisdiction is at times blurred. CompareDahnke-Walker Milling Co. v. Bondurant, 257 U.S. 282 (1921) with Zucht v. King, 260 U.S. 174 (1922).Eliminating the blur often depends upon the skill of counsel. See P. BATOR, P. MISHKIN, D. SHAPIRO &H. WECHSLER, HART AND WECHSLER'S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 637 (2d ed. 1973).See also 28 U.S.C. § 2103 (1976) (the Supreme Court can treat appeal papers as a petition for certiorari
in some circumstances).
528 U.S.C. § 1291 (1976) ("final decision of district courts"). The federal appeals courts do possess, however,
explicitly recognized jurisdiction over certain interlocutory appeals. 28 U.S.C. § 1292 (1976).
"U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1 (seemingly recognizing Congressional discretion regarding even the establishment
of intermediate appeals courts).
"Recognition comes pursuant to the legislative power delegated in OHIO CONST. art. IV, § I ("The judicialpower of the state is vested in . . .courts of common pleas . . . and such other courts inferior to the
supreme court as may from time to time be established by law.").
Summer, 19821
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peals upon questions of law may come to the Ohio courts of appeals, including
the courts of common pleas, the municipal courts and the county courts.
23 In
contrast, the United States courts of appeals entertain appeals from only one
general trial court, the district court.2"
Contemporary appellate authority of the Ohio courts of appeals is a mat-
ter of legislative judgment substantially uninhibited by federal constitutional
restraints. In Blackledge v. Perry, the United States Supreme Court noted it
had "never held that the states are constitutionally required to establish avenues
of appellate review." 2 5 Further, to date there appear to be no significant state
constitutional limits on such legislative judgment. 26 Thus, the firmly entrench-
ed concept of "one trial, one review" is implemented in Ohio via legislative
policy determinations implicit in the Ohio Revised Code. 2
B. Case Volume
Since the elimination of the circuit courts, an Ohio constitutional provi-
sion has indicated that in each appellate district, "there shall be a court of ap-
peals consisting of three judges."" Yet, since 1959, additional provisions have
declared, "Laws may be passed increasing the number of judges in any district
wherein the volume of business may require such additional judge or judges.
In districts having additional judges, three judges shall participate in the hear-
ing and disposition of each case." 29 Today, there are twelve appellate districts
3
"
with fifty-two judicial offices. Five districts remain staffed with the required
"OHIO Rv. CODE ANN. § 2501.02(A) (Baldwin 1978) (appellate jurisdiction of courts of appeals over
judgments of "courts of record inferior to the court of appeals within the district"), OHIO REV. CODE ANN.
§ 1901.30 (Baldwin 1981) (appellate jurisdiction of court of appeals over appeals from municipal court);
OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 1921.01 (Baldwin 1977) (final judgment of a judge of a county court appealable
to the court of appeals). Appeals from the municipal court, and the county court, could not be heard
by the common pleas court even if the General Assembly so desired. OHIO CONST. art. IV, § 4(B), con-
strued in Stone v. Goolsby, 18 Ohio. Misc. 105, 245 N.E.2d 742 (Franklin County C.P. 1969), and Kohut
v. Vance, 22 Ohio App. 2d 205, 260 N.E.2d 615 (1970).
u4In additon to reviewing cases from the district courts, the appellate courts also have such other jurisdic-
tional authority as entertaining cases or orders coming from federal administrative agencies or officers,
see, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 2342 (1976).
2417 U.S. 21, 25 n.4 (1974). See also Ortwein v. Schwab, 410 U.S. 656, 660 (1973); Estelle v. Dorrough,
420 U.S. 534, 536 (1975).
"But see State v. Nickles, 159 Ohio St. 353, 112 N.E.2d 531 (1953), where the court stated: "A reading
of Article IV of the Constitution of Ohio is convincing that it is the spirit of our fundamental law that
a litigant shall be entitled not only to a fair and impartial trial but shall have at least one review if he
so desires." At that time Article IV provided for appellate court jurisdictional authority in the same way
as does the present Ohio Constitution. Compare OHIO CONST. art. IV, § 6 (amended Nov. 7, 1944) with
OHIO CONsT. art. IV, § 3 (adopted May 7, 1968). And note that an earlier state constitutional provision, OHIO
CONST. art. IV, § 6 (amended Sept. 3, 1912), supra note 9, was read to limit legislative judgment. Haas v.
Mutual Life Ins. Co., 95 Ohio St. 137, 115 N.E. 1020 (1916) (finding the General Assembly without power
to limit appeals in chancery cases from the superior court of Cincinnati to the Court of Appeals).
"Id. Whiteside, supra note 18, at § 1.18.
"OHIo CONST. art. IV, § 6 (1851, amended 1912); OHIo CONST. art. IV, § 6 (1851, amended 1944); OHIO
CONST. art. IV, § 6 (1851, amended 1959); OHIo CoNsT. art. IV, § 3.
2"Id.
*OHio REv. CODE ANN. § 2501.01 (Baldwin 1981).
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minimum of three judges. 3, Of the remaining seven districts, four districts have
four judges," two districts have six judges," and the largest district has nine
judges." The number of judicial offices has only recently dramatically increased.
During the 1970's when there were eleven appellate districts, the number of
judicial offices was no greater than forty-four. 5 Notwithstanding this signifi-
cant growth in the number of appellate court judges, the increase has not kept
pace with the rising numbers of cases brought before the courts of appeals.
In 1961, the Ohio General Assembly increased the number of appellate
judges in a district for the first time by authorizing three additional judges for
the eighth district and one additional judge for the tenth district; the new judges
were to take office in 1963.36 At the close of 1961, there was a total of 1,038
cases pending before the courts of appeals,37 thereby averaging about thirty
cases per judge authorized. In 1980, the Ohio General Assembly further in-
creased the number of appellate judges to fifty-two, with authorization for fifty-
three by 1983.38 Yet, at the close of 1980, there were at least 5,290 cases pending, 39
thereby averaging at least 100 cases per judge authorized.
Statistics on a district level are often more staggering. In the sixth district,
for example, the same eight counties have constituted the district since the late
nineteenth century,"0 and until 1981 there were only three judges comprising
that court of appeals."' At the close of 1961 there were seventy cases pending
before the sixth district appellate court, 2 while at the close of 1980 there were
379 pending cases. 3 Thus, in the twenty-year period the number of pending
cases rose over 5000%0 while the number of judges rose only approximately 33%07.
In the fourth district, the number of cases pending at the close of the year rose
3'The third, fourth, seventh, eleventh and twelfth districts, OHIO CONST. art. IV, § 3 and OHIO REV. CODE
ANN. § 2501.01 (Baldwin 1981), for which there are no legislatively authorized increases.
"The second, fifth, sixth and ninth districts, OHIO REV. CODE ANN. 2501.013(A), 2501.01 1(A), 2501.01 1(B),
and 2501.012(B) (Baldwin 1978). The fifth district is scheduled to gain a fifth judge in 1983, OHIO REV.
CODE ANN. § 2502.011(A) (Baldwin 1978).
"The relevant districts are the first and tenth, OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 2501.013(A), 2501.012(C) (Baldwin
1981).
"The eight district, composed only of Cuyahoga county. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2501.012(A) (Baldwin
1981).
"See 129 LAWS OF OHIO 11-12, § 1 (1961); 132 LAWS OF OHIO 941 & 2507 (1968); 136 LAWS OF OHIO 2616,
§ 1 (1976).
31129 LAWS OF OHIO 11-12, § 1 (1961).
"'5 Ohio Courts 1961 Summary, at 3 (1962).
3'OHIo REV. CODE ANN. §§ 2501.011-.013 (Baldwin 1981). There are now 52 appellate judges, with the 53rd
scheduled to take office in 1983. OHIO REv. CODE ANN. §§ 2501.011(A) (Baldwin 1981).
"24 Ohio Courts No. 4, at 5 (1981) (the statewide total listed is 6,121, though the sum of the figures from
the eleven districts is 5,290; the disparity between 5290 and 6121 may result from the failure to include
cases from the twelfth district).
"°See 84 LAWS OF OHIO 240, § 1 (1887); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2501.01 (Baldwin 1981).
"See 132 LAWS OF OHIO 941 & 2507 (1968); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2501.01 I(B) (Baldwin 1981).
" 5 Ohio Courts 1961 Summary, at 3 (1962).
"24 Ohio Courts No. 4, at 5 (1981).
Summer, 1982]
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from fifty-one in 1961"" to 454 in 1980.41 The fourth district remains staffed
with three judges, as it has for at least the past sixty years.4" And in the first
district, the number of judges has doubled from three to six from 1961-1980. 7
Yet, notwithstanding a reduction in the counties within that district, 8 the number
of cases pending at the end of 1980 was 1,097"9 while the number at the end
of 1961 was only ninety-seven. 0
Assuming that today's appellate cases are no easier than those of 1961
and that the number of cases filed in the appellate courts will continue to
increase, 5 seemingly one of two choices will have to be made by the General
Assembly. It can either: 1) continue its pattern of raising the numbers of
authorizations for judicial offices; or 2) eliminate legislative constraints on the
types of cases subject to appellate jurisdiction, as well as on the manner in which
any such jurisdiction should be exercised.
C. Meeting the Demands
The demands made by increased case filings, and the resulting backlog,
should not be met simply by raising the numbers of judges. Rather, there is
a need for significant changes in the business and operating manners of the
Ohio courts of appeals. Fortunately, recent experiences in other intermediate
appeals courts - both federal and state - provide many insights about the
nature of such necessary changes.
As indicated, the general approach in Ohio to date has been to increase
the numbers of judges as case volume grew, though there have been some ex-
periments with other approaches initiated by local appeals courts. This general
approach has failed as, particularly in the last twenty-five years, the additional
volume of new cases has far outstripped the corresponding increase in new
judgeships. But even if the number of new judgeships had kept pace with the
growing case volume,52 continuing such an approach has severe shortcomings.
"5 Ohio Courts 1961 Summary, at 3 (1962).
"24 Ohio Courts No. 4, at 5 (1981).
"See OHIO CONST. art. IV, § 6(1851, amended 1912); OHIo REV. CODE ANN. §§ 2501.01-.013 (Baldwin 1981).
"Three additional judges for the first district took office in February, 1977. 136 LAWS OF OHIO 2616, §
1 (1976).
"Compare 132 LAWS OF OHIO 940 & 2407 (1968) (noting the first district included Hamilton, Clermont,
Butler, Warren and Clinton counties) with OHIo REV. CODE ANN. §§ 2501.01 (Baldwin 1981) (indicating
the first district now includes only Hamilton County).
'924 Ohio Courts No. 4, at 5 (1981).
*5 Ohio Courts 1961 Summary, at 3 (1962).
"These assumptions we are willing to make. Others have suggested today's appellate cases are, in fact,
becoming more difficult. Lawyers Conference Committee on Federal Courts and the Judiciary, 19 JUDGE'S
J. 33,34 (1980) ("One component of the appellate workload problem is the increasing complexity of many
of the new filings.").
"To reduce the ratio of pending cases/authorized judges to the 1961 level, the number of judicial offices
would have to be at least tripled, if not quadrupled. Supra note 39 (dividing either 5290 or 6121 by 30).
Incidentally, Ohio is not alone in its failure to keep pace. In reviewing the growth in state intermediate
appeals court judges nationally from 1966-1979, two commentators found that "[n]early all intermediate
courts expanded - and expanded greatly. The number of intermediate court judgeships, including those
[Vol. 16:1
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As Judge Friendly has noted, a court of appeals is a collegial body where col-
legiality seemingly diminishes rather than increases with dramatic additions of
new judges." The judge observes:
Beyond all this is the desirability of judges of a collegial court really
knowing each other, talking together, lunching together even - perhaps
particularly - drinking together. This promotes understanding, prevents
unnecessary disagreements, and avoids the introduction of personal
animosity into those differences of opinion that properly occur. I believe
that close personal relationships have been one of the sources of strength
of the Supreme Court; when these have degenerated, so has the Court's
performance. I thus agree again with Professor Geoffrey Hazard that 'it
will therefore be simply impossible, in the foreseeable future, to solve the
problem of too many appeals by increasing the number of judges.'""
Assuming larger numbers of judges can still "drink together," the chance of
one three-judge panel proceeding in ignorance of what another three-judge panel
is doing inevitably rises as judicial numbers are increased.55
Of course, the number of judges in any one appellate district can always
be limited simply by expanding the number of appellate districts. In Ohio, this
method has kept certain courts of appeals from becoming too heavily laden
with judicial officers. 6 Yet, the method has not been employed in districts em-
bodying only one heavily populated county. 57 Apparently, the General Assembly
refuses to divide a single county into two appellate districts. Even assuming
expansion of judicial districts can promote collegiality by limiting any one district
in new intermediate courts, has doubled in the past 13 years. The increase, however, has been far less
than the total growth in appeals." Marvell & Kuykendall, Appellate Courts - Facts and Figures, 4 ST.
CT. J. 9, 12 (Spring 1980). And, from 1940 to 1980, the number of federal circuit court of appeals judges
rose about 230% while there was over a 600% increase in the number of cases terminated. ADMIN. OFFICE
OF U.S. COURTS, 1980 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR 1, table 1 (1980). On the fugure federal appeals
court caseload, one author has declared:
As implausible as it may appear, exponential extrapolation of increases over the last decade sug-
gests that by the early 21st century the federal appellate courts alone will decide approximately
1 million cases each year. That bench would include over 5,000 active judges, and the Federal Reporter
would expand by more than 1,000 volumes each year. (footnote omitted)
Barton, Behind the Legal Explosion, 27 STAN. L. REV. 567, 567 (1975).
"1H. FRIENDLY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION: A GENERAL VIEW 45 (1973).
"Id. at 46. See also Luberen's Mut. Cas. Co. v. Elbert, 348 U.S. 48, 58-59 (1954) (Frankfurter, J., con-
curring); P CARRINGTON, D. MEADOR AND M. ROSENBERG, JUSTICE ON APPEAL (1976) 141.
"FRIENDLY, supra note 53, at 45. Judge Friendly finds the method for dealing with this ignorance "means
more work and certainly more delay." Id.
"Until 1921, the eighth appellate district embodied Cuyahoga, Medina, Lorain and Summit counties. 84
LAWS OF OHIO 240, § 1 (1887). Since then, the eighth district has included only Cuyahoga County, while
the latter three counties, together with Wayne, have constituted the territory within the ninth district. See
109 LAWS OF OHIO 88-89, § 1 (1921); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2501.01 (Baldwin 1981).
"Cuyahoga County has been the sole county within the eighth appellate district since 1921, id., and its
appellate judges have increased in number from three to nine during that time. Compare OHIO CONST.
art. IV, § 6 (1857, amended 1912) (indicating only three judges per court of appeal) with OHIO CONST.
art. IV, § 6 (1851, amended 1959) (allowing laws to be passed increasing the number of judges in any
district); 129 LAWS OF OHIO 11-12, § 1 (1961) (indicating 6 judges in the eighth district in 1963); 136 LAWS
OF OHIO 2616, § 1 (1976) (indicating 9 judges in the eighth district in 1977).
Summer, 1982]
7
Parness and Reagle: Reforms in Ohio Courts of ppeals
Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 1983
to no more than a few judges, the method is still flawed. As the number of
districts grow the chance for inter-district conflicts increases, resulting in the
possibility of numerous denials of equal protection and of certifications to the
Ohio Supreme Court based on the "interest" in such conflicts.58
Beside diminution in collegiality, knee-jerk increases in judgeships as case
volume grows constitutes an expensive habit. As Judge Kaufman has observed:
We do need more judges. But legislatures, sensitive to public displeasure
with rising taxes and higher judicial outlays, are going to balk at the millions
required to build new courthouses, create more judgeships, and hire the
supporting personnel if we attempt to solve all our problems by simply
increasing the number of judges. It is like adding more engineers to a
railroad still operating with steam instead of diesel engines.
There was a time when we could perhaps afford the luxury of hav-
ing full time judges deal with every minute detail of a judicial proceeding;
but that moment is gone. We are in a crisis. We have more litigation, the
cases are more complex, and the load continues to grow. 9
No expenses incurred by the state in providing an avenue for appellate review
are reimbursed by any of the parties. While frivolous appeals may lead to the
appellant's payment to the appellee of reasonable expenses including attorney
fees and costs, 60 they lead to no payment to the State. Similarly, while costs
may be taxed against an appellant if an appeal is dismissed or a judgment is
affirmed, and while costs may be taxed against the appellee if a judgment is
reversed, 6' no payments are ever made to the State.
Undoubtedly, an increase in the number of judicial officers would meet
some of the contemporary demands on the courts of appeals posed by the ex-
istence of the "one trial, one review" concept in a litigious society. However,
further medical treatment will be needed to avoid the unceremonious burial
of the present appellate judges in a backlog of cases. The appropriate prescrip-
tion includes changes both in the business and the operating manner of the
intermediate appeals courts. The next few pages will examine some possible
remedies.
III. REFORMS IN THE BUSINESS OF THE OHIO COURTS OF APPEALS
As noted, the Ohio courts of appeals possess appellate jurisdication to
review orders of inferior courts of record, including the common pleas and
"OHIo CONST. art. IV, § 2 (B) (2) (d).
"Kaufman, The Judicial Crisis, Court Delay and the Para-Judge, 54 JUDICATURE 145, 148 (1970). Judge
Kaufman proceeds to suggest increased use of para-judges. See also Carrington, supra note 55, at 138-40.
Of course, financial costs can be reduced if lawyers are recruited as judges. See Lawyers Recruited as
Judges in Oklahoma, 68 A.B.A.J. 792 (1982).
"OHIO R. App. P. 23.
"OHIO R. App. P. 24.
[Vol. 16:1AKRON LAW REVIEW
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municipal courts. 62 Such jurisdictional power must be exercised" upon the timely
filing"' and diligent prosecution" of an appeal from an appropriate lower court
order." This jurisdictional power embodies the concept of "one trial, one
review, ' 61 a concept which is not unique to Ohio.68 Notwithstanding its longevity
and its wide acceptance elsewhere, however, the concept may be in need of
legislative reconsideration.
The need for re-evaluation of the "one trial, one review" concept was cited
by at least a few judges who responded to our survey. One judge focused on
criminal appeals, suggesting an "investigation into the desirability and feasibili-
ty" of requiring the courts of appeals to grant a motion to certify prior to hearing
"any appeal of a minor misdemeanor conviction, or other misdemeanor not
involving a sentence including days of confinement." 69 A second judge went
beyond criminal cases suggesting "exploration of the limiting of cases which
can be appealed," and noting "[Pierchance, a financial limit in civil cases, a
bar to manifest weight questions where a jury verdict has been rendered; a bar
to criminal appeals where a sentence has not been imposed and/or where the
fine and costs are below a certain limit." 0 Similar re-evaluation and reform
"See supra notes 17 and 23.
"The power derives from OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2501.02 (Baldwin 1978), which employs the phrase "upon
an appeal." That phrase is comparable to the Ohio constitutional phrase "in appeals," OHIO CONST. art.
IV, § 2(B)(2)(a), governing the Supreme Court's mandatory jurisdiction, and contrasts with the certifica-
tion procedure, OHIO CONST. art. IV, § 2(B)(2)(d), governing the Supreme Court's discretionary power to
review (upon showing of public or great general interest).
"In Ohio, the rules provide appeals in both civil and criminal cases usually must be filed "within thirty
days of the date of the entry of the judgment or order appealed from." OHIO R. APP. P. 4(A)& (B). After
the expiration of this thirty day period, an appeal as of right in criminal cases "may be taken only byleave of court." OHIO R. ApP. P. 5(A). Incidentally, it has been suggested that statutory ambiguity man-dates "the safe course to follow" in civil cases is to file notice of appeal within twenty days. WHITESIDE,
supra note 18, at § 7.04.
""Failure of an appellant to take any step other than the timely filing of a notice of appeal does not
affect the validity of the appeal, but is ground only for such action as the court of appeals deems ap-propriate, which may include dismissal of the appeal." OHIO R. APP. P. 3(A). See also OHIO R. APP. P.
11 (c) (appellants' failure to cause timely transmission of the record may lead to dismissal).
"Often, it is difficult to distinguish appealable from nonappealable orders, notwithstanding the defini-
tion of the final order in OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 2505.02 (Baldwin 1978). See, e.g., T. KoYKKA. HH1o
APPELLATE PROCESS, § 6.02 (Cum. Supp. 1981); WHITESIDE, supra note 18, at §§ 3.19 (distinguishing bet-
ween trial court decisions and judgments) and 5.03 (distinguishing between preliminary or interlocutory
orders and appealable order). For examples of final appealable orders, see WHITESIDE, supra note 18, at§ 5.18.
"See supra note 27 and accompanying text.
"In United States ex rel. Johnson v. Cavell, 468 F.2d 304, 315 (3rd Cir. 1972), the court observed:
it should be noted that the Constitution does not require the states to afford appellate review
of criminal convictions. There simply is no federal constitutional right to appeal. Thus, the mere
averment that petitioner has been denied the right to appeal does not, without more, properly in-
voke the habeas jurisdiction of the federal courts.
Pennsylvania, as all other states, however, although not constitutionally required to do so,
has elected to provide appellate review of criminal convictions as a matter of right (footnotes omitted).
But see Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 475 n.7 (1976) ("Prior to 1889 there was, in practical effect, no
appellate review in federal criminal cases").
"Response of Judge 25.
"Response of Judge 11.
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presently are being both discussed and implemented outside of Ohio.7'
Maybe the easiest place to start excepting to the "one trial, one review"
concept is in situations where the one trial has been preceded by an earlier trial.
Presently in Ohio, the mayors in most municipal corporations wherein there
exist no municipal courts have jurisdiction to hear and determine any prosecu-
tion for the violation of an ordinance of their municipality,7" together with
jurisdiction in most criminal causes involving moving traffic violations occur-
ring on state highways located within the boundaries of the municipality.73 Ap-
peals from a mayor's court may be taken to a relevant municipal or county
court7 ' where proceedings are de novo.75 When such municipal or county court
proceedings are appealed to a court of appeals, there exists a "one trial, two
appeals" concept.7 6 It seems reasonable to consider eliminating the courts of
appeals duty to hear such cases, perhaps by making this appellate court review
unavailable,77 or discretionary with the courts,7" or unavailable unless the sole
issues raised relate to the constitutionality of the statute or ordinance on which
the conviction is based.7 9
"See, e.g., D.C. CODE ANN. § 11-72(c) (1981) ("application for allowance to appeal" necessary when review
sought of orders of the small claims or conciliation branches of the trial court, as well as of certain criminal
case orders); R. STERN, APPELLATE PRACTICE IN THE UNITED STATES, 18-19 (1981); Burger Report on the
Federal Judicial Branch - 1973, 59 A.B.A.J. 1125, 1127 (1973); Lay, A Proposalfor Discretionary Review
in Federal Courts of Appeals, 34 Sw. L.J. 1151 (1981); Note, The Virginia Judicial Council's Intermediate
Appellate Court Proposal, 16 U. RICH. L. REV. 209 219-21 (1981).
"OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1905.01 (Baldwin 1979). Exempted municipal corporations are those where "a
judge of the Auglaize county, Crawford county, Jackson county, Miami county, Portage county or Wayne
county municipal court sits" as required by law. Id.
"Id. Exempted criminal cases are those governed by OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 2937.08 & 2938.04 (Baldwin
1979). Incidentally, much of the mayor's court jurisdiction is concurrent with the jurisdiction of others.
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1907.031 (Baldwin 1977) (concurrent jurisdiction in the county court).
14OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1905.22 (Baldwin 1977).
"OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1905.25 (Baldwin 1977).
7 Or a "two trial, one appeal concept" if an appeal de novo is deemed a trial. Id. And consider the com-
ments of Judge Friendly on appellate court review of trial court determinations of appeals from ad-
ministrative agency action:
A somewhat more debatable change, still within the contours of the existing system, would
be to provide that where review of administrative action lies in the district court and that court
has affirmed, appeal should be only by leave of the court of appeals. The argument would be that
it is enough to grant an aggrieved citizen one judicial look at the action of disinterested govern-
mental agency, unless a superior judicial body believes the case to present a problem going beyond
the particular instance. There would be much to recommend such a procedure, for example, with
respect to the many complaints of denial of relief, whether partial or total, by the Social Security
Administration (footnotes omitted).
FRIENDLY, supra note 53, at 176. But for resulting problems in the grant of certiorari jurisdiction, see J.
HOWARD, COURTS OF APPEALS IN THE FEDERAL JUDICIAL SYSTEM (1981).
"It has been suggested that such unavailability of any review is to be avoided because of the "penal ele-
ment" in the lower court proceedings, as well as the "prosecutorial initiative conferred on the state."
STANDARDS RELATING TO APPELLATE COURTS § 3.80 commentary at 110 (1977) [hereinafter cited as
STANDARDS].
"Such an approach recently has been suggested for the Washington State Court of Appeals. Callow, Pro-
jections and Predictions(:) Washington State Court of Appeals, WASH. ST. BAR NEWS 35, 36 (April, 1981).
See also Weisberger, Appellate Courts: The Challenge of Inundation, 31 AM. U.L. REV. 237, 241 (1982).
"Such an approach recently has been employed in Texas. TEX. CODE CRIM. PRO. ANN. art. 4.03 (Vernon
1982 Pocket Part).
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It is perhaps a bit less reasonable to consider an exception to the "one
trial, one review" concept in the criminal setting beyond those cases begun in
a mayor's court. Any such exception may well be unique among the American
states.8" Yet, why not become the exception, at least in criminal cases where
no confinement is ordered, where any assessed fines and costs involve insubstan-
tial dollar amounts, and where a conviction neither has a foreseeably signifi-
cant role in any future state proceeding (judicial or administrative) nor stigmatizes
the violator in the eyes of his or her community? The creation of such an ex-
ception seems particularly appropriate if one of the surveyed judges is correct
in observing that these criminal cases occur fairly frequently and rarely present
any legitimate issues of law.81 Such an exception would bring several benefits,
including financial savings to both the state,82 which must support the courts
of appeals, and to the appellee." It would also allow the appellate court judges
to spend more time on those cases where more is at stake. Further, such an
exception arguably does contain the rationale needed for the inequality in treat-
ment between groups seeking to appeal criminal convictions."4
Regarding civil cases, the American Bar Association's Commission on Stan-
dards of Judicial Administration has suggested that appellate review of on-record
civil proceedings involving limited amounts (at least those under $2,500, and
perhaps those up to $10,000) should be permitted only in the discretion of the
appellate court.85 This suggestion was prompted by a desire to "keep expense
to the parties and burden on the courts at a level reasonably proportionate to
the matters in controversy." 86 For similar reasons, it has recently been sug-
gested that federal courts of appeals should be granted discretion "to refuse
to review, at least in civil cases, any appeal that on its face does not appear
to be substantial or meritorious."87
"Supra note 68. See also Note, supra note 71, at 220-21 (arguments against exceptions to the "one trial,
one review" concept).
"Response of Judge 25.
"While figures on the cost to the state of providing a mechanism for the hearing of an appeal in a single
case seem incalcuable to us, one intermediate appeals court judge estimated the cost, at least in the State
of Washington, to be between $1000 and $2000. Callow, supra note 78, at 36. For a cost-benefit analysis
of another long-established judicial procedure, the jury trial, see Alexander, Civil Juries in Maine: Are
the Benefits Worth the Costs?, 34 ME. L. REV. 63, 65-66 (1982).
"See supra notes 60 and 61 and accompanying text.
"On the need for a rationale, consider Justice Harlan's concurring opinion in Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S.
12, 37 (1956):
Of course, the fact that appeals are not constitutionally required does not mean that a State is
free of constitutional restraints in establishing the terms upon which appeals will be allowed. It
does mean, however, that there is no 'right' to an appeal in the same sense that there is a right
to a trial. Rather, the constitutional right under the Due Process Clause is simply the right not
to be denied an appeal for arbitrary or capricious reasons.
This rationale is usually adjudged under the so-called rational basis test. Estelle v. Dorrough, 420 U.S.
534, 538 (1975); Ortwein v. Schwab, 410 U.S. 656, 660-61 (1973); Rinaldi v. Yeager, 384 U.S. 305, 309 (1966).
"STANDARDS, supra note 77, at § 3.80(a).
I Id. at § 3.80 commentary at 110.
"Lay, supra note 71, at 1155.
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Because it is uncertain how insubstantial or unmeritorious appeals can be
quickly and correctly distinguished from those worthy of review,88 considera-
tion should be given to discretionary review of civil cases valued below a cer-
tain dollar amount. A $10,000 figure appears a bit too high, at least presently,
and exceptions might need to be made for certain civil cases. For example, cases
involving low dollar amounts, but also significant federal or state constitutional
questions, might need to be exempted so that they are not repeatedly resolved
without appellate court review.
Regardless of whether or not exceptions are made to the "one trial, one
review" concept, there is a need to re-evaluate the manner in which the Ohio
courts of appeals' business is conducted. Restricting the business of these ap-
pellate courts will not, by itself, provide a long-term solution to the problem
of ever-increasing caseloads. And, the re-evaluation of the manner of conduc-
ting business can provide many benefits. Consider the recent observations of
Judge Godbold, a federal appeals court judge for the past sixteen years:
If the enormous growth of appellate caseloads is an ill wind, it has blown
considerable good. It has forced appellate courts to re-evaluate what they
are doing and to think about whether and how they can do it better.
Courts are not always attuned to re-evaluation. Lawyers and judges,
schooled in history and precedent, are wedded to the past. We tend to
do things in familiar and uncomfortable ways that bear the seal of previous
approval. But the external force of caseloads has pushed appellate courts
out of their accustomed channels of thought. Events beyond the control
of the courts has engendered a spirit of reexamination ....
No more significant re-evaluation has occurred than scrutiny of the
premise that all appellate cases.., must be immutably accorded the full
range of all appellate procedures. Courts have found the courage to look
with questioning eyes at their policies on oral argument, the necessity for
opinions, the content of opinions, and the contents of records.89
"One judge has suggested the following procedure:
each litigant seeking an appeal in any civil proceeding would be required to file a petition for discre-
tionary review with the notice of appeal. The petitions would be limited to ten pages and would
set forth the reasons the appeal should be allowed. Each petition would attach a copy of the district
court's memorandum and judgment. Third, a three-judge panel would then review this petition
within ten days of its filing. Any one circuit judge could grant the petition by directing the clerk's
office to docket the appeal . . . . If the panel desires, it may request a response to the petition
from the other side. Fourth, if the face of the petition presents any colorable issue of disputed
law or presents a serious challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, the appeal should be allowed.
Fifth, a district court could certify that an appeal presents a colorable issue for review; if such
a certification is given, the parties could proceed without further permission from the court of ap-
peals. Sixth, if the petition for review is not deemed insubstantial by the panel, but nonetheless
appears to raise a narrow or simple issue for review, the court may allow docketing of the appeal,
set the matter down for summary argument without plenary briefing, and summarily dispose of
the case by opinion or order. This latter procedure could aid the courts in establishing a summary
calendar and serve to expedite and process a large number of appeals.
Id. at 1155-6. And consider Sup. CT. R. 17 (considerations governing review on certiorari). Oberman, Coping
with Rising Caseload 1I: Defining the Frivolous Appeal, 47 BROOKLYN L. REV. 1057 (1981).
"Godbold, Improvements in Appellate Procedure: Better of Available Facilities, 66 A.B.A.J. 863, 863 (1980).
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There are encouraging signs in Ohio that the spirit of re-examination has begun.9°
The next section will discuss possible changes in the operating manner of the
Ohio courts of appeals in hopes of further promoting judicial and legislative
re-evaluation.
IV. REFORMS IN THE OPERATING MANNER OF THE
OHIO COURTS OF APPEALS
Assuming that all appellate cases in the Ohio courts of appeals can no longer
be immutably accorded the full range of all appellate procedures, choices must
be made regarding which cases should receive less than the full range of tradi-
tional procedures and which procedures are most expendable. A variety of cases
and procedures are suggested by recent commentaries, as well as by changes
in other jurisdictions. Possible reforms can be characterized in a number of
ways.9 This article will examine such reforms within the context of the prehear-
ing, hearing, and posthearing stages in the intermediate appellate court process.92
This examination is not meant to present an exhaustive list of possible reforms,
nor a comprehensive analysis of the potential changes which are discussed.
Rather, it is intended to promote further discussion, and perhaps action, on
some of the more viable means of coping with the pressures on Ohio's in-
termediate appellate courts.
A. Prehearing
Several prehearing devices have been suggested, if not used, for easing the
pressures of case backlogs. All but one appears either quite unappealing or un-
worthy of extended discussion. For example, in the state of Washington there
is pending a proposal to quadruple the appellate filing fees in order to discourage
non-meritorious appeals, particularly frivolous civil appeals.93 This is quite unat-
tractive. It is equally unappealing to suggest that appellate cases could be reduced
with the establishment of a very short time period for the filing of an appeal
from a lower court judgment. Finally, difficulties elsewhere regarding rules re-
quiring appellants to file a separate appendix9 ' do not merit discussion, as the
Ohio courts of appeals do not discourage appeals by the imposition of this costly
"See Black, Hide and Seek Precedent: Phantom Opinions in Ohio, 50 U. CIN. L. REV. 477 (1981).
"For example, reforms might be differentiated according to the decisionmaker (legislature, supreme court,
local courts of appeals, courts of appeals judges) responsible for initiating reforms. As well, reforms might
be distinguished based upon the varying lower courts whose decisions are reviewed (limited jurisdic-
tion/general jurisdication, or law-trained/lay judges); upon whether review is mandatory or discretionary;
upon the nature of the case reviewed (civil/criminal, or a little money/a lot of money, or felony/misde-
meanor); or upon the issues raised on appeal (constitutional, statutory, common law, etc.).
"In doing so, we define hearing to include those steps in the appellate process relating to the litigants'
opportunity to be heard, as contrasted with the prerequisite steps to a hearing (i.e., timely appeal, filing
fees) and with the courts' decisionmaking responsibilities after the hearing (i.e., written opinions, publication
of opinions).
"Callow, supra note 78, at 36.
"For a discussion of the relevant Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure and the trouble thereunder, see
Ainsworth & Ripple, The Separate Appendix in Federal Appellate Practice-Necessary Tool or Costly Luxury,
34 Sw. L. J. 1159 (1981).
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prerequiste to a hearing.95
One appealing and worthy prehearing device, which has been used both
in96 and out97 of Ohio to help ease the pressure of case backlogs, is the prehearing
conference. Pursuant to rule, an Ohio court of appeals "may direct the at-
torneys for the parties to appear before the court or a judge thereof for a prehear-
ing conference to consider the simplication of the issues and such other mat-
ters as may aid in the disposition of the proceeding by the court."
98 Orders
entered following a prehearing conference typically control the subsequent course
of the appellate proceeding. 99
For the prehearing conference device to be viable, the appellants, or all
parties, would have to file prehearing conference statements."'0 These statements
would constitute neither appellate briefs nor trial transcripts."
0
' Rather, they
would provide the court with minimal, but adequate, information upon which
discussions at the conference could be based. The statements' contents might
need to vary depending upon the purpose or purposes of the conference, but
should include at least: (1) the trial and appellate courts' numbers; (2) the names,
phone numbers, and addresses of the parties and counsel; (3) the type of litiga-
"1OHIO R. APP. P. 9. See, e.g., OHIO 8TH DIST. R. 4 and Appendix A. "Praecipe," of the Local Rules of
the Eighth Appellate Judicial District of Ohio.
"Responses to the survey indicated that at least the appeals courts in the first, sixth and eighth Districts
have used prehearing conferences in appellate cases in seeking to reduce case backlogs. But such uses ap-
parently have been discontinued. See Responses of Judges 20, 23 and 25. Local appellate rules typically
do not address the prehearing conference option. But see OHIO 1ST DIST. R. (indicating the multiple pur-
poses of conferences in civil appeals, which can only be had subsequent to the filing of Form II, Civil
Docket Statement), and 8TH DIST. R. 14 (no conference in absence of any attorney of record, except by
waiver). For a review of the experience in the Sixth District Court of Appeals, see Potter, Prehearing
Conferences. A Report on a New Approach, 26 TOLEDO BAR Assoc. NEWSLETTER 8 (April, 1979). For a
review of the experience in the First Appellate District, see Letter from Judge George Palmer to Professor
Jeffrey Parness (April 28, 1982) (copy on file with AKRON LAW REVIEW).
"Prehearing conferences are utilized in most federal circuit courts, though their purpose and form varies.
See D. MEADOR, APPELLATE COURTS: STAFF AND PROCESS IN THE CRISIS OF VOLUME, Appendix F at 231-239
(1974) (Informative, but some of the information is now outdated). See also, 8th CIR. R. 2 (mandating
conferences in certain civil appeals), and 13 THIRD BRANCH 3, col. 1 (June 1981). For recent descriptions
of state court use of such conferences in civil case appeals (to either an intermediate or a high court) see,
e.g., Crouch, The New Maryland Appellate Pre-Argument Conference, 14 MD. B.J. 7 (April 1981); Janes,
Paras, and Shapiro, The Appellate Settlement Conference Program in Sacramento, 56 CAL. ST. B.J. 110
(1981); Scott and Moskal, The Prehearing Conference - Perhaps Your Only Opportunity to Present Oral
Argument to the Minnesota Supreme Court, 7 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 283 (1981): Note, The Minnesota
Supreme Court Prehearing Conference - An Empirical Evaluation, 63 MINN. L. REV. 1221 (1979) (the
Minnesota high court is the state's only real appellate court).
"OHIO R. APP. P. 20
"Id. The appellate court's discretion in calling a conference, together with the controlling effect of any
resulting order, make Rule 20 similar to Rule 16 of the Ohio Civil Rules on pretrial conferences.
'In the First Appellate District of Ohio, the Civil Docket Statement is only completed by the appellant.
OHIO IST DIST. R. 10, supra note 96. By contrast, in Minnesota a similar statement is filed by both sides,
MINN. R. Civ. APP. P. 133.02(A), though that rule was only recently changed, see Note, supra note 97, at
1224 n.18. In Maryland the filing by the appellee is discretionary with the party, MD. R. P. 1023(B). See
also the Appeal Information Form, 8th CIR. R. 1. (both parties). The few extra days it would take appellee
to file a supplemental statement is well worth the slight, additional time delay (in Minnesota, the appellee
has ten days to supplement, id.).
'In describing such statements, a court would be wise to indicate the differentiation from a brief or transcript
in BOLD TYPE. Note, supra note 97, at 1227 n.22.
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tion involved; (4) the nature of the judgment or order appealed from, together
with a copy of the same and any supporting trial court memorandum; (5) the
probable issues to be raised on appeal, together with copies of any trial briefs
thereon; and, (6) the type of record probably relevant to the appeal. 2 In large
part such statements could be supplied on forms provided by the clerk's office.
Prehearing conferences have been employed for any one of several reasons,
and for a multiplicity of purposes. The major motivations in scheduling a con-
ference have been to help the court to: (1) expedite or facilitate the hearing
and resolution of the appeal in a traditional manner, including briefing, oral
argument, and written decision; (2) settle the appeal without judicial decision;
or, (3) dispose of the appeal by judicial decision without according the tradi-
tional hearing and resolution. In Ohio, the general rule is broad enough to cover
any or all of the foregoing motivations.
The utilization of a formal prehearing conference device solely to expedite
or facilitate a traditional appellate proceeding is seldom found. However, in
the District of Columbia Court of Appeals a civil appeals management plan
was initiated to simplify and expedite appeals.0 3 There, conferences typically
were conducted by the Chief Staff Council, and contacts often were only by
letter or telephone. 104 The aim was to gain agreement on the scheduling of briefs
and arguments, to decrease the number of briefs filed in complex cases, to ar-
range for the filing of briefs longer than the rules ordinarily permit, and to
arrange for the allocation and length of oral argument time' 5 - all "without
bothering the court with a number of motions."'0 6 Formal conferences with
counsel present and with judicial involvement seem unwarranted to achieve such
goals. 07 Non-judicial court personnel can be delegated the authority to assist
in the drive to expedite and facilitate the hearing of appeals. And recent evidence
seemingly indicates that, notwithstanding the lack of any mandatory prehear-
ing conference, appellate adversaries do communicate with one another in at-
tempts to ease the burdens of appellate litigation.' 8
Assuming the legitimacy of holding prehearing conferences for the pur-
"'°OHIo IST DIST. R. 10, supra note 96. Note, supra note 97, at 1227 n.22.
" STERN, supra note 71, at 479. See also Civil Appeals Management Plan of the D.C. Circuit (copy on file
with AKRON LAW REVIEW).
104STERN, supra note 71, at 479.
1"1Id. at 479-80.
1'1d. at 480.
1°1In the District of Columbia, the local appeals court can be resorted to by motion if the Chief Staff
Counsel's action is deemed inappropriate. Id. In Ohio's First Appellate District the court administrator
or a staff attorney sometimes handle pre-appeal conferences in civil cases, with counsel but not judges
present. See Letter from Judge Palmer, supra note 96.
"'Goldman, The Civil Appeals Management Plan: An Experiment in Appellate Procedural Reform, 78
COLUM. L. REV. 1209, 1235-36 (1978).
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pose of inducing settlements,' 9 there is sharp debate on the benefits derived.'1'
The American Bar Association's Task Force on Appellate Procedure recently
observed:
On the pro side, if the system does accelerate dispositions without brief-
ing, argument, or opinions, then it has achieved a distinct benefit ....
On the other hand, if all that happens is that an extra time-consuming step
is injected into the process, or if undue pressure to settle is being forced
on the parties, or if the only cases being settled are those which would
be settled anyway, then the achievement is, at best minimal."'
Though several empirical studies have been made recently of appellate court
rules designed to promote settlement, the results are mixed." 2 The responses
received from Ohio appeals court judges are also mixed." '
It seems inappropriate for the Ohio appellate courts to move forward now
with a major program embodying numerous prehearing conferences designed
to induce settlements in all or most civil appeals. The experience with such con-
ferences in other states indicates that judicial officers would need to preside
in order for the program to have any chance of significant success.I" Judicial
officers simply are not available in most appellate districts in Ohio, even assuming
retired judges are willing and usable." 5 According to one Ohio appeals court
"'°One distinguished commentator on appellate procedure has deemed such conferences of "doubtful"
legitimacy even if they do result in a reduction of the judicial work load. STERN, supra note 71, at 479.
"'Stern finds "the benefit of a prehearing conference does not seem to be worth any substantial effort,"
id. at 479, though he recognizes the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit is "satisfied" with
its plan for prehearing settlement conferences and will continue with it.
I I 'AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION TASK FORCE ON APPELLATE PROCEDURE, EFFICIENCY AND JUSTICE IN APPEALS:
METHODS AND SELECTED MATERIALS 50-51 (1978).
"'Goldman studied the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, and found its plan did improve
the court's "overall performance," but that "the magnitude of improvement was slight." Goldman, supra
note 108, at 1237. A study of the Minnesota Supreme Court's experiment was less reluctant to proclaim
a "success." Note, supra note 97, at 1256. These two studies were based on similar evidence, e.g., surveys
of participating overseers and attorneys, as well as comparison of cases which did and did not undergo
a prehearing conference. The Second Circuit program relied upon staff counsel to conduct the prehearing
conference, while the Minnesota Supreme court's experiment - at the time studied - utilized both judicial
and nonjudicial. officers. See Goldman, supra note 108, at 1217-18; Note, supra note 97, at 1228. The
Minnesota program now utilizes only judges, MINN. R. Civ. APP. P. 133.02(D), and there is much debate
about the additional effectiveness of using judges rather than staff counsel or other nonjudicial officers.
See Note, supra note 97, at 1231-2; Goldman, supra note 108, at 1238 ("This experiment suggests thatjudge participation may be needed to achieve the desired reduction in the overall judicial burden"). See
also Weisberger, supra note 78 at 250-52.
" 'One judge noted prehearing conferences "could be used to greater advantage," while another felt they
"should be used as extensively as possible." Responses of Judges 9 and 21. Yet, there was a judge who
questioned the cost effectiveness of such conferences, and another who found them of "little practical
advantage." Responses of Judges 7 and 18.
"'Supra note 112.
' The availability of retired judges is subject to fluctuation, as there is no legal mandate for certain numbers
to exist at any one time. This fluctuation would hamper any atempt at establishing a long-term program
greatly dependent upon retired judges. In five of the twelve appellate districts today, there sit only three
judges, see supra note 31 and accompanying text, the number needed to "participate in the hearing and
disposition of each case," OHIO CONST. art. IV, § 3(A). In four other districts, there sit only four judges,
supra note 32. Thus, regular judges are unavailable in most districts since we believe no presiding officer
at the prehearing conference should ever participate in any subsequent hearing and disposition.
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judge, an appellate district in Ohio, which had conducted a successful prehearing
conference program, has abandoned the program due to "manpower
restrictions."' 16
What does seem appropriate for Ohio is a program, perhaps experimen-
tal in nature and limited to fewer than all appellate districts, in which prehear-
ing conferences are held in two types of appeals: (1) where there is a good chance
that settlement could be reached in a civil appeal with the help of a neutral
arbiter; and (2) where there is a significant (if not good or likely) chance that
the appeal could be fairly decided without the full range of traditional appellate
procedures. Such a program could be initiated pursuant to local rule,"I7 and
might not involve the need for additional fiscal expenditures.Is Prehearing con-
ference statements would form a basis for discussion at the conference." 9
However, such conferences should not be presided over by anyone potentially
involved in the subsequent hearing and disposition of the case. 20 Possible
presiding officers include appellate court judges, retired judges, or non-judicial
appellate court staff members.
Experience indicates chances of settlement are greatest in civil appeals in-
volving insubstantial money damages. The experience in California, for exam-
ple, indicates "the largest number of settlements have been reached in personal
injury and domestic relations cases" and that "money judgments and eminent
domain actions are also generally good candidates for settlement conferences."' 2'
After reviewing both state and federal experiences, Professor Leflar noted "cases
involving money damages have the highest probability of being settled," and
that "more than one-third of the preheard cases are settled or withdrawn. "122
Certainly, the estimated expense of a traditional civil appeal will cause many
litigants to think anew about settlement, particularly when a result of the prehear-
ing conference includes an estimate by the informed presiding officer about
the likely outcome should the appeal be fully heard. ' 23 Additionally, settlement
"'See Response of Judge 20.
"' OHIO CONST. art. IV, § 5(B) (courts can adopt additional rules concerning local practice not inconsistent
with rules promulgated by the supreme court).
"'Where available, retired judges as well as active judges might be employed. But see supra note 115.
And, if nonjudicial officers are used, they may well be already existing court personnel (court administrator,
law clerk(?), staff attorney).
"See supra notes 100-102 and accompanying text.
I "This conforms to the rule utilized in most jurisdictions having substantial numbers of prehearing con-
ferences. See, e.g., 8TH Cm. R. 2(c) (confidentiability of "settlement-related material and settlement
negotiating"); Crouch, supra note 97, at 9; Janes, supra note 97, at 110 (settlement conference proceedings
are "confidential"). But note the recent change in Minnesota, which now permits a justice to participate
in the final disposition of cases for which he has conducted a prehearing conference, and the bar's disap-
proval of the change. Note, supra note 97, at 1228 n.28 and 1254-55. In the Second Circuit, the staff
counsel conducting the conference does not convey significant information to the court regarding the con-
ference proceedings. Goldman, supra note 108, at 1217-18; Lake Utopia Paper Ltd. v. Connelly Con-
tainers, Inc., 608 F.2d 928 (2d Cir. 1979) cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1076 (1980).
'1'Janes, supra note 97, at 111.
1'2R. LEFLAR, INTERNAL OPERATING PROCEDURES OF APPELLATE COURTS 31 (1976).
"'Note, supra note 97, at 1229 (indicating presiding officials in Minnesota made educated estimates on
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chances would appear significant in cases where litigants in prehearing con-
ference statements indicated a willingness to negotiate with a view toward possible
settlement.
Assuming attorneys at the appellate level usually discuss the possibility of
settlement in cases where money damages or party willingness to negotiate are
involved,1 24 one may wonder whether prehearing conferences would cause signifi-
cant additions to the numbers of cases settled. Possibly they would, because:
First, ... the conference removes the problem of the party who is predispos-
ed toward settlement but fears that any unilateral suggestion on his part
would be seen by his opponent as an admission of weakness. Second, the
conference makes it simpler for the lawyer who believes his client's case
is weak to advise settlement, because a neutral and authoritative figure
like the conference official would have given that same advice. Third, a
recalcitrant party may become more amenable to settlement following a
frank discussion ... which alerts him to the weakness or futility of his
case on appeal. Fourth, settlement prospects are enhanced among parties
who perceive the prehearing conference as their 'day in court' (cites
omitted). ' 25
Of the concerns expressed regarding such settlement conferences, the most
troubling is the prospect that in some cases the conference might simply pro-
vide a vehicle for harassment, or "a relatively inexpensive forum for attacking
adverse lower court judgements" which would otherwise not be appealed and
which are pursued with the hope of procuring a late settlement. 2 While cer-
tain acts of bad faith might be detected and cured by the officer presiding at
the prehearing conference,'27 some faith in counsel's professional conduct seems
necessary.
If the goal of settlement cannot be reached, attendants at a prehearing
settlement conference should proceed to seek ways to promote a speedy, but
just, judicial resolution. Counsel can agree to limit the number or length of
any briefs; to provide the appellate court with an agreed "statement of the case"
in lieu of a more elaborate record;'2 to limit the length, or waive, the oral argu-
ment; and to limit the issues subject to appellate review. Also, pursuant to a
limited delegated authority, the presiding officer could arrange for certain
the likelihood of reversal). The possible staff counsel action in prehearing conferences in the U.S. Court
of Appeals for the Second Circuit has been described as follows:
In sum, if the appeal was viewed by staff counsel as without merit, or of so little merit as not to
warrant the time of judges to decide the appeal, staff counsel would urge the appellant, with rhetoric
and logic, to withdraw or encourage the parties to accept a compromise solution.
Goldman, supra note 108, at 1218.
"'Goldman, supra note 108, at 1235-56.
'Note, supra note 97, at 1230.
"'Id. at 1232 and 1233 n.63.
'7Id. at 1233 n.63. On the means of discovering bad faith appeals, see Oberman, supra note 88.
"..OHIO R. App. P. 9(D).
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modifications to the traditional appellate procedure which could otherwise be
obtained only upon formal written motion and court order. For example, the
presiding officer could grant extensions of the time allowed for filing, brief-
ing, and argument if they were deemed warranted,' 29 or allow the filing of ex-
hibits and over-sized briefs.' 30 The presiding officer could also permit oral
arguments for particular parties to exceed thirty minutes,' 3 ' and hold the
operating scheduling orders for certain appeals in abeyance, in hopes of pro-
moting settlements.' 3 2
Though it is a far more controversial purpose, further experiments should
be conducted in Ohio involving prehearing conferences designed to promote
occasional judicial resolution of appeals without certain well-established ap-
pellate procedures, even where there is no good chance that settlement can be
reached. The use of prehearing conferences solely or primarily to expedite ap-
pellate court resolution is controversial because it involves court personnel -
perhaps nonjudicial as well as judicial officers - in the decisional process,
thought the ultimate responsibility for decision is with others. Yet, the schedul-
ing of a prehearing conference for a multiplicity of possible goals, including
settlement and a more expeditious judicial resolution, is not unheard of in
American intermediate appeals courts. 33 Furthermore, some such courts have
also employed the prehearing conference for the primary purpose of achieving
expeditious judicial resolution.'34
The issues confronting a court of appeals in initiating a prehearing con-
ference program have been summarized as follows:
(1) the point in the process where the screening mechanisms become opera-
tion; (2) the person or persons who make the classification; (3) the degree
of involvement by staff personnel in making recommendations as to
classifications; (4) the degree to which oral argument is limited; (5) the
decisional process used in those cases which are not argued; and (6) the
degree of support by staff personnel in the decisional process in those cases
"'Goldman, supra note 108, at 1218.
13"ld.
"'Pursuant to OHIO R. App. P. 21, "Unless otherwise ordered, each side will be allowed thirty minutes for
argument."
"'Goldman, supra note 108, at 1218.
'"Pursuant to its recently adopted rules, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit allows a "pre-
argument conference" for consideration of "the possibility of settlement, the simplification of the issues,
and any other matters which ...aid in the handling of the disposition of the proceedings." 6th CIR.
R. 18 (C)(2). See OHIO 1st DIST. 10, supra note 96, wherein Ohio's First Appellate District allows prehear-
ing conferences to include discussions of:
(1) The finality of the Order being appealed; (2) type of record to be filed; (3) probable time re-
quired to complete preparation of the record on the appeal; (4) assignment of error and issues to
be raised; (5) any prior Court decisions on similar issues; (6) time needed for briefing; (7) the iden-
tity and address of all counsel involved; (8) other matters relating to the case.
See also MD. R. P. 1024(B); 8th CIR. R. 2(a); Scott and Moskal, supra note 97, at 299.
'See MEADOR, supra note 97, Appendix F at 231-39; Ubell, Report on Central Staff Attorneys' Offices
in the U.S. Court of Appeals, 87 F.R.D. 253 (1980).
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which are not argued. 1"I
Because experimentation within the districts is the initial step in establishing
a pretrial conference program in the Ohio courts of appeals, the foregoing issues
cannot be fully explored at this time. However, several observations are ap-
propriate regarding any future experiments.
Experiments should be conducted with screening mechanisms which operate
shortly after an appeal is filed. Such mechanisms would necessarily rely on so-
called prehearing conference statements which provide basic information about
the appeal, but which are far less substantial than the totality of written briefs,
oral argument and the record. These statements should be required in cases
in which there is a good chance either for settlement or for judicial resolution
without the full range of traditional appellate procedures. Cases of this type
should be described by a local rule which is capable of easy application by the
court clerk as cases are filed. Such a local rule might distinguish civil and criminal
appeals, and then further subdivide each category. For example, civil appeals
might be characterized by the parties as involving less than a certain dollar
amount; equitable, legal, or both equitable and legal relief; constitutional issues;
nonconstitutional issues involving a controlling question of law as to which
there is substantial ground for difference of opinion; discretionary determina-
tions by the trial court; two courts' rather than one court's earlier involvement;
judgments which foreseeably might be settled with court assistance; non-
dispositive lower court orders; and noncompliance with relevant time limits for
the filing of the appeal. 36 Finally, there should be a variety of forms for prehear-
ing conference statements, because information relevant to one character of
civil appeal (where settlement is deemed possible, or where time limits have
not been met) may not be needed for another.'"
Prehearing conferences of an experimental nature could be presided over
by regular appellate judges, retired judges, court staff members or others.'38
'
3 5MEADOR, supra note 97, at 232.
"'In making such characterizations, the local rulemakers should consider not only their court's prior ex-
perience, if any, but also the experiences in other jurisdictions regarding the types of cases most likely
to settle, or to be resolvable fairly and yet without traditional appellate procedures. See, e.g., LEFLAR,
supra note 122, at 31 (finding that money judgment cases are good candidates for settlement and that
experience shows more than one-third of preheard cases are settled or withdrawn); Crouch, supra note
97, at 8 (pre-hearing conferences not valuable in most pro se appeals and where there are constitutional
issues or unique questions of law); Janes, supra note 97, at 111-12 (good candidates for settlement are
personal injury and domestic relations, money judgment and eminent domain cases; unsuitable candidates
are cases raising constitutional issues, declaratory relief, or questions of law in areas where the Rule of
law is unclear); Note, supra note 97, at 1243-44 (study confirming significant change of appellate case
settlement where less than $10,000 is involved). Of course, designation of forms of civil cases for prehear-
ing conferences cannot be based on such illegitimate factors as the litigant's indigency. Anders v. Califor-
nia, 386 U.S. 738 (1967).
"'In many appeals courts where such statements are sometimes required, there exist more than one form.
See, e.g., OHIo IST DIsT. 10, supra note 96 (forms for both a criminal and a civil docket statement); 6th
CIR. R. 18(B) and 20 (distinguishing between civil case pre-argument statements and one-page fact sheets
in all Social Security appeals, Title VII appeals, habeas corpus § 2254 appeals and motion to vacate §
2255 appeals).
"'While regular appellate judges, Note, supra note 97, at 1228, retired judges, Benjamen and Norris, The
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As noted earlier, whoever presides should not be involved in any subsequent
hearing involving full briefing, oral argument and a record.'3 9 Besides assisting
in promoting settlement or a more expeditious route to judicial resolution pur-
suant to counsels' agreement,'I0 the presiding officer should be allowed to make
recommendations to the panel assigned to the case. These recommendations
would be based on findings regarding the merits (procedural or substantive)
of an appeal upon which the parties seek a hearing. They might include advice
on the need for full appellate procedures; on the need for emphasis on certain
issues; on the lack of any need for oral argument; on the lack of any need for
a published opinion, or any opinion at all; on the desirability of remand prior
to an appellate hearing; and on the appropriateness of an award of costs, or
sanctions. While many such recommendations would require the panel's early
consideration (i.e., prior to the filing of briefs or any oral argument), we believe
benefits can accrue to the court and to many appellate litigants with such early
involvement: If recommendations are accepted by the court, nontraditional hear-
ing procedures could be ordered which would result in time and money sav-
ings with no substantial injustice to appellate litigants with meritorious claims.
While experiments with forms of prehearing conferences seem a legitimate
pursuit, in part because of potential financial savings, it appears that many,
if not all, appeals courts are currently without the rather modest resources
necessary to implement such experiments. Responses to the authors' survey in-
dicated this, and even suggested that certain prior experimentation had been
halted primarily for budgetary reasons.'' The survey also indicated the skep-
ticism of some judges regarding the utility of such conferences.' Where prehear-
ing conference programs have been established elsewhere, early additional finan-
cial support has been necessary, and those providing the support have assum-
Appellate Settlement Conference, 62 A.B.A.J. 1433, 1436, and Janes, supra note 97, at 133, and staff
members, Goldman, supra note 108, at 1217, have been used for varying prehearing conference, it may
be that members of the local bar might also be used - as is done by the trial courts having compulsory
arbitration rules. See, e.g., Rules of the Court of Common Pleas of Cuyahoga County, General Division
and Domestic Relations Division, R. 29. Also consider whether use of staff members who would soon
become "career clerks" is advisable. Oakley and Thompson, Law Clerks in Judges' Eyes: Tradition and
Innovation in the Use of Legal Staff by American Judges, 67 CALIF. L. REV. 1286, 1293-95 (1979). See
also CARRINGTON, supra note 54, at 44-46.
"'Supra note 120.
'40See supra notes 128-32 and accompanying text.
"'See Responses from Judge 20 (citing "manpower restrictions" as reason for discontinuance); Judge
8 (citing pressures on "an already overworked sitting bench"); Judge 12 (no judges are "available"); Judge
14 (impractical to use "staff attorney"); Judge 19 (judges "do not have time," and there are inadequate
legal and administrative staffs); Judge 13 (demands on judges' time are now too great for any utilization
of prehearing conference rule).
"'Responses from Judge 7 (prehearing settlement conferences not "cost effective"); Judge 25 (results do
not justify expenditure of judicial time); Judge 23 (likelihood of settlement remote); Judge 18 ("utiliza-
tion of judicial man hours with limited benefits"); Judge 17 (little likelihood of settlement, but helpful
in complicated cases); Judge 4 ("absolutely worthless"). More positive about the likely success of a prehearing
conference program were the responses from Judges 6, 8, 9, 12, 13, 16, 19, 20, 21 and 24. The disagreements
among sitting appellate judges about the utility of prehearing conferences was a strong motivating force
in our suggestion of further experimentation in Ohio.
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ed the necessary task of objectively evaluating the program.' 43 In Ohio, evalua-
tion, if not financial support, might come from the supreme court's exercise
of its power of superintendence over all courts in the state.'
44
B. Hearing
Review herein of possible reforms during the hearing stage of an in-
termediate appeals court proceeding need not be extensive in view of recent
commentary in and beyond this symposium.' 45 Of course, any review of the
hearing stage must take account of, and will be dependent upon, such factors
as the nature of the appeals courts' jurisdiction and of any significant prehear-
ing proceedings. As noted earlier, certain changes in the jurisdiction and prehear-
ing proceedings of the Ohio appeals courts are in order. This section will com-
ment briefly on possible reforms during the hearing stage of a case which is
within the appeals court's jurisdictional authority and which has been deter-
mined worthy of full briefing.
The general appellate rules are quite explicit regarding the content of briefs,
demanding that each contain varying tables; a statement of the assignments
of error; a statement of the case, including statements concerning the issues
and their relevant facts as well as the disposition in the court below; an argu-
ment, including reasons relevant to the assignments of error presented; and
a short conclusion stating the precise relief sought.' 46 These rules also require
reproduction (or supply) of any constitutional, statutory, ordinance, rule, or
regulatory provision deemed relevant to the assignments of error. 4 Such rules
are typically supplemented by additional local rules concerning practice in the
several appellate districts.' 41 One common local rule limits the length of any
brief filed, usually to thirty or forty pages, except by prior permission of the
court.' 49 While these local rules seem legitimate and in line with practice in other
states' appellate courts, it might be more appropriate to have a general rule
which sets uniform standards statewide.' 50 A less common local rule requires
'"Goldman, supra note 108, at 1210 (noting the role of the Federal Judicial Center in the program of
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 2nd Circuit). See also Benjamen and Norris, supra note 138, at 1434.
'"OHIO CONST. art. IV, § 5(A)(a) (1) and (2).
'"See, e.g., Black, supra note 90.
'"OHIo R. App. P. 16(A). Note that at times appellate cases are subject to early, or sua sponte, dismissal
prior to briefing and oral argument, with the discovery of such cases bring the responsibility of the court's
staff. See Letter from Judge Palmer, supra note 96; Letter from Judge Alan Norris to Professor Jeffrey
Parness (May 14, 1982) (copy on file with AKRON LAW REVIEW).
'"OHIO R. APP. P. 16(E).
'"These rules are promulgated pursuant to OHIO CONST. art. IV, § 5(B) ("courts may adopt additional rules
concerning local practice ... not inconsistent with the rules promulgated by the supreme courts"). For
an example of a local rule supplementing the general rule on brief contents, see OHIO IST DIST. R. 6. Re-
cent changes in the OHIO R. APP. P. provide for possible local rules regarding accelerated calendars. 55 0.
ST. Bus. Ass'N. REP. 192 (1982).
'"On rules of forty page limits, see OHIO 6TH DIST. R. 10; OHIO 8TH DIST. R. 6. On rules of thirty-page
limits, see OHIO 9TH DIST. R. 13.
"'For example, the federal circuit courts of appeals are governed by FED. R. APP. P. 28(g) which limits
the number of pages in a brief, except by permission of the court.
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briefs to be accompanied by copies of any unreported opinions which are cited. I II
Again, the rule seems reasonable, prevalent elsewhere, and better left to a
generally prevailing law."I2
A comprehensive rule for Ohio appeals courts on citation to unreported
decisions has recently been proposed, and should receive serious consideration.
The proposal contemplates that citations to unpublished decisions and opinions
will be recognized only if complete copies are attached, a full disclosure is made
of any known disposition by the Supreme Court of any appeal therefrom, and
counsel certifies that also attached are copies of all other relevant Ohio un-
published appellate opinions and decisions that have come to his or her
attention.' 3
The general appellate rules in Ohio mandate that upon submission of briefs,
a certain amount of time be allowed to litigants for oral arguments.' 54 Pur-
suant to the rules, each side is allowed thirty minutes for oral argument "unless
otherwise ordered."'"I I Such orders are sometimes embodied in local rules which
indicate only fifteen minutes of oral argument per side, unless the court per-
mits additional time. 156 One local rule indicates no oral argument will be heard
in criminal appeals "except upon written motion supported by good cause."'I57
A litigant, 5 ' or litigants,' 59 can waive their right to be heard orally, but any
waivers by all litigants are subject to judicial veto. 6"
Allowance of an opportunity for oral argument on appeal is not mandated
by the federal constitution, '6 and appears to be simply a matter of policy fur-
"'OHIO 8TH DIST. R. 19.
"'It should be noted that in Ohio, there are differences in the handling of unreported opinions from district
to district, Black, supra note 90, and that in the federal appeals courts, the matter of unreported opinions(unlike brief length) is subject to some variation. See Reynolds & Richman, The Non-Precedential Prece-
dent - Limited Publication and No-Citation Rules in the United States Courts of Appeals, 78 COLUM.
L. REV. 1167, 1180 (1978).
'Letter from Judge Robert L. Black, Jr. to several Ohio appeals courts judges (November 6, 1981) (on
file with the AKRON LAW REVIEW). See also Black, supra note 90, at 492-94.
"'OHIO R. App. P. 21(A) states: "The court shall advise all parties of the time and place at which oral argu-
ment will be heard." (emphasis added). And when, oral argument is not mandated, the rules are quite
explicit. Consider OHIO R. App. P. 21(G) which says: "Oral argument will not be heard upon motions unless
ordered by the court."
Recent experimentation with oral argument without preceding or subsequent briefs will not be ad-
dressed. See Deane & Tehan, Judicial Administration in the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit,
11 GOLDEN GATE L. REV. 1, 15-16 (1981).
"'OHIO R. App. P. 21(B)
"'OHIO IST. DIST. R. 9; OHIO 6TH DIST. R. 9; OHIO 8TH DIST. R. 10; OHIO 9TH DIST. R. 12; OHIO 10TH DIST.
R. 9.
"'OHIO 2ND DIST. R. 2. The rule is a curious one, given OHIO R. App. P. 21(A) and (G), supra note 154.
Perhaps, it is justifiable under the "unless otherwise ordered" provision of OHIO R. App. P. 21(B), supra
note 155 and accompanying text.
"'OHIO R. App. P. 21(E) (nonappearance of one party at oral argument does not foreclose another party
from being heard).
"'OHIo R. App. P. 21(F) (parties can agree to submit a case for "decision on the briefs").
"'OHIo R. App. P. 21(E) and (F).
"'See, e.g., Price v. Johnston, 334 U.S. 266, 280 (1948), where the Court said:
Summer, 1982]
23
Parness and Reagle: Reforms in Ohio Courts of Appeals
Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 1983
AKRON LAW REVIEW
thered by the general appellate rules. ' 61 Responses to the authors' survey in-
dicated a variety of viewpoints on the continuing need, and the cost, of this
policy. These responses reflect the varying visions of oral argument seen in con-
temporary commentary and appellate rule changes outside Ohio.
The policy regarding oral argument was strongly supported by a signifi-
cant number of judges responding to the survey. A few indicated appellate oral
argument constituted a crucial part of the right to a "day in court," '' 63 While
others deemed it a "crucial step in the decisional process for judges"6" and
necessary because of the possible changes of opinions on the merits prompted
by such argument. 165 Several judges supported the present policy as long as
the court regularly exercised its ability to limit arguments to less than thirty
minutes for each side. 66 Two respondents supporting the policy restated the
prevailing rule regarding counsels', rather than the court's, ability to waive
argument. 16
7
However, a fair number of respondents expressed support for changes in
the current policy on oral argument. A few suggested that counsel be required
to request oral argument,' 68 with one noting the need for counsel also to in-
clude a "reason. 11 69 Three indicated oral argument in at least some types of
cases should be discretionary with the court. 7 '
Several responses regarding oral argument were quite interesting, and
reflected the divisions of opinion on the state's policy. One judge found oral
argument to be "of little help toward final resolution," yet believed it should
Exceptional situations may arise where a circuit court of appeals might fairly conclude that oral
argument by a prisoner in person is 'reasonably necessary in the interest of justice.' True, an appeal
can always be submitted on written briefs. But oral argument, while not indispensable, is frequent-
ly if not usually desired by the parties.
Recent rule changes reflect recognition of the discretion of the federal circuit courts of appeals on
the matter of oral argument. FED. R. App. P. 34(B) ("The clerk shall advise all parties whether oral argu-
ment is to be heard, and if so, of the time and place therefor, and the time to be allowed each side").
And see 6TH CIR. R. 9(B) (establishing standards guiding determinations as to the availability of oral argu-
ment) and 9(C) (allowing parties to address in their briefs the reasons why oral argument should be made
available).
'"OHIO R. App. P. 21(A). We find no evidence of any explicit mandate in the Ohio Constitution that oral
argument be made available. But consider OHIO CONST. art. IV, § 3(A) (requiring three judges of a court
of appeals to participate in the "hearing" of every case). And note that the policy revails whether or not
the appeals courts are "hot" or "cold." WHITESIDE, supra note 18, at § 19.08 (indicating that most Ohio
appeals courts are "hot" in that briefs are read prior to argument). For validation of an oral argument
policy different from that in Ohio, see Sabatinelli v. Travelers Insurance Co., Mass., 341 N.E.2d 880
(1976); Mass. Appeals Court Rules for the Regulation of Appellate Practice, R. 1.28.
"'Responses of Judges 23 and 24.
"'Response of Judge 7.
"'Response of Judge 6.
"'Responses of Judges 4 and 8. The responses of Judges 12, 20 and 22 specifically mentioned a usual
fifteen-minute time limit. Supra note 156.
'7Responses of Judges 13 and 14.
"'Responses of Judges 15 and 21. See, e.g., Oklahoma Rules on Practice and Procedure in the Court
of Appeals and on Certiorari to that Court, R. 3.7, and Okla. Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals, R. 3.8.
"'Response of Judge 21.
"'Responses of Judges 9, 16 and 19.
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continue to be "a right."' 7 ' Another found it often "wasteful and redundant,"
but supported the present policy because the courts of appeals are usually the
"courts of last resort." A third was "not persuaded that oral argument will
change the disposition made by the court except in a rare case," but did "not
favor elimination.'" Two other judges concurred in their finding that fifteen
minutes is "about an irreducible minimum" of time for oral argument, and
went on to state:
While it is true that most oral argument is relatively unproductive, I have
seen too many instances where oral argument did in fact either define an
issue or resolve an issue, to be tempted to further restrict the right. Although
they should be so, briefs are not always as carefully or thoughtfully
prepared that they may be relied upon entirely. Colloquy between court
and counsel during oral argument frequently produces results both sur-
prising and illuminating. 'I
But, what if oral argument is not carefully or thoughtfully prepared - should
other rounds of written and oral argument be held until there is care and thought?
And, might not written arguments be better prepared if the opportunity for
oral argument was not guaranteed?
The split of opinion among the Ohio appeals court judges on the policy
of oral argument is similar to that found in contemporary commentary and
appellate practice elsewhere. One recent commentary described the basis for
the split as follows:
Recent literature shows tension between two divergent tendencies: to re-
tain an essential practice, part of the 'procedural amenities' through which
courts are 'seen to be obeying and enforcing the law,' and to curtail its
use in some types of cases to facilitate its retention in others, where it is
thought more useful.'"
Recent studies of both state and federal judicial attitudes regarding oral argu-
ment demonstrate the same general divisions of opinion on the utility of oral
argument in all cases. 6 These attitudes have prompted a rather wide variation
in the ways in which appellate courts today provide for oral argument. One
recent report indicates that while in some state intermediate appeals courts "few"
"'Response of Judge 11. Perhaps this can be rationalized by recognizing the importance of oral argument
to the public's perception of an appeals court and to public confidence. Wasby, Oral Argument in the
Ninth Circuit: The View From Bench and Bar, 11 GOLDEN GATE L. REv. 21, 68 (1981).
"'Response of Judge 17.
'"Response of Judge 18.
"'Response of Judge 25 at 2-3.
"'Wasby, The Functions and Importance of Appellate Oral Arguments, 65 JUDICATURE 340, 342 (1982)
(citing Carrington, Ceremony and Realism: Demise of Appellate Procedure, 66 A.B.A.J. (1980), and God-
bold, supra note 89).
'Wasby, supra note 175, at 348-52 (survey of certain federal appellate court judges, with a finding that
lawyers also surveyed were generally less in favor of eliminating oral argument than were the judges);
Simons, "Oral Argument of Appellate Cases: A Practice Worth Preserving?," 37 J. OF MO. BAR 369,
372 (1981) (survey of both certain federal and state appellate court judges).
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cases are decided without oral argument, in other similar courts more than half
the cases are resolved without such argument."'
Notwithstanding these apparently dramatic differences, closer examina-
tion of the evidence and commentary outside Ohio demonstrates substantial
agreement on certain occasions when elimination of oral argument by appeals
courts is acceptable. One researcher summarized earlier comments in this way:
The Hruska Commission stated in 1975 that 'to mandate oral argument
in every case would be clearly unwarranted'.. . At about the same time,
the Advisory Council on Appellate Justice recommended that 'oral argu-
ment should be allowed in most cases' but also conceded 'it may be cur-
tailed or eliminated in certain instances'.. . The American Bar Associa-
tion's ... House of Delegates opposed 'the rules of certain United States
courts of appeals which... entirely eliminate oral argument in a substantial
portion of non-frivolous appeals' (emphasis added) (footnotes omitted).'"s
The researcher went on to show that earlier surveys of federal circuit judges
as well as lawyers also reflected agreement on the legitimacy of eliminating oral
arguments in certain cases.' 79
Assuming oral arguments are to be discretionary with an intermediate ap-
peals court in some cases regardless of counsels' desires, most would agree these
cases include frivolous civil appeals or civil appeals whose results are clearly
and fully governed by recent precedent.' 80 Regarding criminal cases, there is
stronger sentiment that oral argument should occur even if the appeal is frivolous
or simple and noncontroversial. Although usually useless, oral argument is seen
as necessary in criminal cases to maintain a positive public perception of the
court and public confidence in the court's fairness.'
The time is ripe for a change in Ohio's policy on oral argument in its courts
of appeal, and these courts should be given discretion to deny the opportunity
"'Marvell & Kuykendall, supra note 52, Table 9 at 36.
"'Wasby, supra note 175, at 351.
"'Id. at 351 (noting that about 90076 of circuit judges surveyed by the Federal Judicial Center recognize
occasions when elimination of oral argument is an acceptable procedure). Even some of those who op-
pose with "regret" the trend toward mandatory curtailment of oral argument, and label such a "mis-
step, advocate "invited waiver," whereby the court "encourages avoidance of a useless proceeding," i.e.,
oral argument. Carrington, supra note 54, at 16-17, 21.
s"Wasby, supra note 171, at 65. And see, e.g., 6TH CIR. R. 9(B) (no argument in frivolous appeals, ap-
peals involving dispositive issues recently authoritatively decided, and appeals where oral argument is not
a significant aid); 10TH CIR. R. 10(D) (no argument where no substantial question, manifest error, or no
jurisdiction).
'Wasby, supra note 171, at 65. And consider Carrington, supra note 54, at 58:
Appeals are an important part of the solemn process and symbolism that are vital to the legitimacy
of criminal law enforcement. In overseeing trial court proceedings, appellate courts are special symbols
of the respect our legal system accords to individual rights and concerns. They provide visible
assurance to the accused and to society that the criminal law is being administered fairly and lawfully.
Appeals symbolize deliberative, personalized consideration and a rejection of mass production
methods and bargain basement justice that often afflict criminal trial proceedings. Appeals must
be conducted in ways that insure that the reality is consistent with the symbolism.
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for oral argument in all but exempted cases. Situations where discretion is denied
should include capital and other major felony cases, as well as cases involving
nonfrivolous federal or state constitutional questions. Further, the experimen-
tal prehearing conference programs should be used to assist appeals courts in
exercising any newly-placed discretion to eliminate oral argument. The prehearing
conference statement could be employed to discover not only which cases can
be resolved without oral argument pursuant to attorney agreement, but also
the reasons why counsel desires oral argument in cases which might otherwise
appear to the prehearing conference's presiding officer, and others, to be un-
worthy. Recommendations on the need for oral argument should be made by
the presiding officers at prehearing conferences in which no settlement is reached.
These recommendations should be made according to criteria established pur-
suant to local court rule, and should be rejected upon the dissent of any member
of the three-judge panel assigned the case.' 82
C. Posthearing
However a case becomes ripe for an Ohio appeals court decision (whether
by discretionary or mandatory jurisdictional authority, with or without a
prehearing conference, full briefing or oral argument), there are a number of
ways in which such a decision can be rendered and a number of matters which
such a decision can address. Again, the issues of economy, efficiency and fairness
arise during consideration of possible reforms.
Regarding the manner of decisionmaking, present Ohio law is quite clear
in many respects. For example, an appeals court's hearing and disposition of
any case must involve the participation of three judges.' 83 The three judges are
responsible for determining the appeal "on its merits on the assignments of
error set forth in the briefs ... on the record on appeal ... and, unless waiv-
ed, on the oral arguments.""18 Finally, these judges must also pass upon in
writing all errors assigned and briefed, "stating the reasons for the court's deci-
sion as to each such error."' 85
This final requirement, operative for about twenty-five years, 8 I is said to
12Godbold, supra note 89, at 864 (indicating comparable procedure the U.S. Court of Appeals for theFifth Circuit); 5TH CIR. R. 18; 11TH CIR. R. 23(B). In Rhode Island, the Supreme Court hears orally (ten
minutes), and by written argument (ten pages), from parties seeking rejection of a pre-briefing conference
officer's recommendation that a criminal case be resolved without traditional briefing and oral argument.
"Supreme Court Provisional Order No. 16," 30 R.I. B. J. 14 (1981); Weisberger, supra note 78, at 246.
"'OHIO CONST. art. IV, § 3(A).
'"Olo R. App. P. 12(A).
'"Id. To our knowledge, there have never been preliminary, or "tentative," written rulings in Ohio to
facilitate oral argument. Saeta, "Tentative Opinions," 20 JUDGE'S JOURNAL 20 (Summer 1981). As with
oral argument, supra note 162, passing in writing upon all assignments of error is not constitutionally
mandated. As the U.S. Supreme Court recently said: "Undoubtedly, a court need not elaborate or give
reasons or rejecting claims which it regards as frivolous or totally without merit." Sumner v. Mata, 101
S. Ct. 764, 770 (1981).
'"The requirement apparently first appeared in 1955. Compare 126 LAWS OF OHIO 58, § 1 (1955), with
116 LAWS OF OHIO 109, § 1 (1935). (The latter required that all assigned errors to be passed upon by the court,
and that orders of reversal and remand for further proceedings contain statements of the error or errors
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be based on the desire to "avoid a remand and another appeal" in those cases
where the Supreme Court disagreed with, and overruled, a limited or "specific"
ruling of a court of appeals. 87 It could also be justified as a means of pro-
moting more careful consideration by the appeals court" and as a part of a
litigant's "day in court."' 89 While these rationales possess some merit, they
are not sufficiently convincing to compel support of the requirement. The re-
quirement applies in all cases, including those where Ohio Supreme Court review
is very doubtful, 9 ' but the rule arguably does not significantly promote a more
careful consideration than would otherwise occur. Instead, boilerplate reasons
accompany decisions on many types of assignments of error. In opposing con-
tinued employment of this requirement, the chief concern is the valuable judicial
(and nonjudicial) time spent on preparing the required writings.' 91 While the
present requirement does provide some benefits, it also sacrifices benefits which
found in the record; the former required reasons for decisions - whether or not there is a reversal and
remand). Compare the older cases of Freeman. V. State, 131 Ohio St. 85, 1 N.E.2d 620 (1936) and In
re Wyson, 30 Ohio Law Abs. 316 (App. Ct. 2d Dist. 1939) with Smith v. Jaggers, 33 Ohio St. 2d 1, 292
N.E.2d 641 (1973).
"'Rothfuss v. Temple Co., 27 Ohio St. 2d 131, 134, 271 N.E.2d 801, 803 (1971) (Leach, J. concurring).
"'Carrington, supra note 54, at 31-32. See FED. R. Civ. P. 52(a) (in non-jury trials, judges must "find facts
specially and state separately its conclusions of law); Featherstone v. Barash, 345 F.2d 246, 249 (10th
Cir. 1965) (Rule 52 seeks to evoke care on the part of the trial judge).
"'Supra notes 162 & 181.
'Supreme Court review is doubtful in most cases where review is discretionary. OHIO CONST. art. IV,
§ 2(B)(2). See Black, supra note 90, at 480 ("the vast majority of cases terminate at the court of appeals
level"). See also State v. Jennings, 69 Ohio St. 2d 389, __ N.E.2d - (1982) (finding the requirement
applicable to assignments of errors the appeals court found irrelevant).
"'The requirement also inhibits experimentation with other manner of decisionmaking. For example, in
some appellate courts decisions are announced from the bench immediately after oral argument. STERN,
supra note 71, at 384 (citing EFFICIENCY AND JUSTICE, supra note 111). Such a procedure may well not only
save the judges the time of preparing a written decision addressing all assigned errors, but also provide
the litigants with a much earlier notice of the resolution of their case. See the Response of Judge 25, con-
curred in by the response of Judge 5, advocating this procedure in "appropriate criminal appeals." Also
consider the Oklahoma high court's adoption of the "fast track" concept. See Perry, The Fast Track:
Accelerated Disposition of Civil Appeals in the Oklahoma Supreme Court, 8 OKLA. CITY U. L. REv. 453
(1981); Hufstedler & Nejelski, ABA Action Commission Challenges Litigation Cost and Delay, 66 A.B.A.J.
965, 967 (1980).
We are convinced that appellate judges are able to distinguish cases deserving written opinions from
those that do not. In a recent study of the operation of a rule permitting an intermediate appeal court
to affirm, without published written opinion, the authors concluded:
Critics seem to have found some instances of written but unpublished opinions that appear
to have potential precedential value. Perhaps even the Fifth Circuit's practice has suppressed some
affirmations that, had opinions been written, might have had precedential value. The evidence and
analysis in this study, however, suggest that such instances are probably quite infrequent. If the
purpose of Rule 21 is to speed the appellate judicial process without a significant loss of preceden-
tial opinions, and if that process is viewed as a group activity, adjudicating large sets of repetitive
events, then the laments of the critics of Rule 21 seem more sentimental than rational. (footnote
omitted).
Suchman & Gelfand, The Use of Local Rule 21 in the Fifth Circuit: Can Judges Select Cases of 'No Preceden-
tial Value'?, 29 EMORY L.J. 195, 224 (1980). Also consider U.S. Supreme Court practice. See Sup. CT. R.
23 (summary disposition of petitions for certiorari); Levin, Adding Capacity to the Federal System, 39
WASH. & LEE L. REv. 1, 6-7 (1982) (on summary procedures in cases where federal statute requires review
on the merits).
Finally, consider Judge Weisberger's remark that "justices of many appellate courts literally have
been driving themselves to the brink of intellectual and physical exhaustion by attempting to increase their
opinion output rather than pursuing remedies through alternate decisional modes." Weisberger, supra
note 78, at 249.
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may be of more importance, particularly given the limitations on the availability
of law clerks and other parajudicial personnel. Perhaps the requirement might
be modified regarding some, but not all, types of cases.
As with the topic of oral argument, responses to the survey indicated a
divergence of opinion on the continued need for the requirement of a written
reason for the court's decision as to each assigned error. 92 And, like oral argu-
ment, several of the responses provided interesting reflections on the relevant
tension between the beneficial aspects of the requirement and the limitations
on judicial and nonjudicial time. One judge commented on the requirement
as follows:
In principle, it has merit because counsel should know the basis for a court's
opinion. However, it has become burdensome because of lawyer abuses
and the lack of a definitive ruling from the Supreme Court as to its
requirements. " I3
Other judges concurred as follows:
App. R. 12(A) is doubtless a burden in many routine cases. Where we
conclude that an assignment of error is wholly without merit, there is little
incentive to waste valuable time listing the reasons why it is meritless. If
the entire appeal is similarly meretricious, the motivation is even less to
waste time on its disposition. I suspect there is substantial support among
my brothers throughout the state for some formal relaxation of the rule.
Nevertheless, I would oppose any substantial change .... First... the
per curiam affirmance... inevitably left counsel and litigants wondering
to what extent the court had truly examined the issues. I have always felt
... that judicial indifference or inattention, or even the suspicious (suspi-
cion?) thereof, was never (tolerable).... Second, the Ohio Supreme Court
appears to be satisfied by a graceful nod in the direction of App. R. 12(A),
so that the rule is not really as onerous as might be supposed. 9
Assuming the aforesaid manner of decision-making remains so that writ-
ten decisions emanate in appellate determinations, issues remain regarding what
these decisions should address beside the assignments of error. One such issue
involves whether the court's decision is to be published. Another concerns the
conditions under which costs, or sanctions, should be imposed on any of the
litigants or lawyers involved in the appeal.
The current Ohio practice regarding publication of appellate court opi-
nions recently has been comprehensively and thoughtfully analyzed elsewhere. ",
"'Compare responses from Judges 5, 7, 14, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, and 25 (supporting the present
requirement), with responses from Judges 6, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, and 16 (suggesting some change in the
requirement).
"'Response from Judge 8.
"'Response from Judge 25, concurred in by Judge 5's response.
"'Black, supra note 90.
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An apparent outgrowth of that analysis is the pending proposal regarding pro-
mulgation of a new appellate rule on the criteria to be used in determining which
opinions are to be published. 1 9 6 Inter alia, the proposal contemplates publica-
tion of decisions which establish new rules of law or modify existing rules, "apply
an established rule of law to facts significantly different from those in previously
published applications," elaborate on the history of an existing rule, create or
resolve a conflict of authority, concern issues of significant public interest, or
concen significant legal issues about which there exist concurring or dissenting
opinions.'
Survey responses indicated some support for, and no opposition to, a new
rule establishing criteria for the publication of appeals courts' decisions.' 98 One
judge, after finding "Ohio's failure to publish the opinions of its courts of ap-
peals" to be "a matter of great importance that has received little attention,"
went on to state:
I think of the effect of unresolved inconsistencies and conflicts not only
between the twelve districts but within them individually, and the effect
of underpublication on the quality of the judicial product as well as on
public and professional confidence. Further, I would suggest that under-
publication may have some effect on the recruitment and retention of high
quality professionals in our judicial system, particularly when combined
with salaries and support systems that have been dramatically eroded by
inflation. 199
Another judge observed that Ohio was "desperately" in need of a new system
for publication of appeals courts' decisions.10°
Regarding costs and sanctions, the real threat of their use should cause
a decrease in the numbers of frivolous, and marginal but nonfrivolous, ap-
peals. Presently, one Ohio appellate rule requires that if an appeal is dismiss-
ed, "costs" are to be taxed against the appellant, "unless otherwise agreed by
the parties or ordered by the court." Costs otherwise are made subject to court
order, though the absence of any order triggers the taxing of costs against a
wholly losing party.2"' A second rule grants appellate courts the discretion to
"require the appellant to pay reasonable expenses of the appellee including at-
torneys fees and costs" upon a determination that "an appeal is frivolous. "202
Yet, it does not appear that these rules are utilized to deter the filing of in-
substantial appeals. In perhaps a somewhat exaggerated statement, one respon-
dent to the survey lamented:
"'Supra note 153.
11Id. Proposed Rule 25(A) at p. 3.
" Responses from Judges 5, 6, and 7.
'"Response from Judge 5.
2"Response from Judge 6.
20'OHIO R. App. P. 24.
202OHIO R. App. P. 23.
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... In my opinion, a large share of this increase of numbers of appeals
results directly from the inability and, in most cases, unwillingness of
lawyers to discourage clients from appeals which must be fruitless on their
merits. The most frequently recurring significant example of this is the
failure of counsel intelligently to explain to his client that a Court of Ap-
peals is not a "super jury" before which he will get a second chance to
argue who is telling the truth. It is professionally disturbing to me that
the circumstances indicate that this flows directly from economic pressure
on increasing numbers of lawyers coupled with decreasing number of
worthwhile cases.
It appears that to some significant extent the judiciary is pressured
into silence about this subject because of the already severe public criticism
of the profession generally.... We do have serious problems, but in my
opinion their solution lies beyond tinkering with the appellate rules.
I am certain that much of the problem about which I speak is a result
of recent rulings of federal courts expanding the malpractice exposure of
lawyers, especially those appointed to represent indigent prisoners, as well
as changes in concepts of judicial and professional immunity which en-
courage lawyers to take the fruitless appeal rather than bear the burden
of explaining later why they did not.
In short, it appears that the mess we are in did not come upon us
quickly and it will be a very long time before we can work our way out
of it.2 °3
Of course, utilization of these Ohio rules causes clients to pay for their
attorney's agreement, and perhaps strong advice, to pursue appellate review. 04
While no Ohio appellate rule addresses attorney financial and professional
responsibility regarding the avoidance of insubstantial appeals, there is com-
parable precedent for such duties. For example, pursuant to the civil procedure
rules in many jurisdictions, trial courts can order payment of reasonable ex-
penses, including attorneys fees, by attorneys advising clients who fail to obey
2
"Response from Judge 14. And note the recent U.S. Supreme Court pronouncement: "It is the obliga-
tion of any lawyer.., not to clog the courts with frivolous motions or appeals." Polk County v. Dodson,
102 S. Ct. 445, 452 (1981) (footnote omitted).
14In Cine Forty-Second Street Theatre Corp. v. Allied Artists Pictures Corp., 602 F.2d 1062, 1068 (2nd
Cir. 1979), the court said:
where gross professional negligence has been found - that is, where counsel clearly should have
understood his duty to the court - the full range of sanctions may be marshalled. Indeed, in this
day of burgeoning, costly and protracted litigation courts should not shrink from imposing harsh
sanctions where, as in this case, they are clearly warranted.
A litigant chooses counsel at his peril ... and here, as in countless other contexts, counsel's
disregard of his professional responsibilities can lead to extinction of his client's claim. (footnote
omitted)
It would be with the greatest reluctance, however, that I would visit upon the client the sins
of counsel, absent client's knowledge, condonation, compliance, or causation.
Id. at 1069 (Oakes, J.. concurring).
Summer, 1982]
31
Parness and Reagle: Reforms in Ohio Courts of Appeals
Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 1983
an order to provide or permit discovery205 or who fail to respond to legitimate
discovery requests. 6 And, other civil procedure rules allow trial courts to take
"disciplinary action" against attorneys who willfully file pleadings which they
know are without "good ground to support." o2  In the federal appeals courts,
attorneys can be subject to "disciplinary action" for conduct unbecoming a
member of the bar or for failure to comply with the federal rules of appellate
procedure or for failure to comply with any local court rule.
208
The Ohio appeals courts' failure to impose sanctions to deter unmeritorious
actions is not unique. One study of discovery practices of Chicago area civil
litigators found:
The widely shared impression that if judicial intervention occurs at all it
is likely to be superficial also reportedly encourages discovery abuse ....
The characteristic of judicial responses to discovery problems which was
by far the most often cited as encouraging discovery abuse, however, is the
courts' studied reluctance to impose sanctions. In fact, many litigators
apparently would go a step further and suggest that the infrequency and
the leniency with which courts use their sanctioning power is the root cause
of discovery abuse. Such lawyers would argue that it is the relatively
minimal risk of sanctions that sets cycles of abuse in motion. According
to this theory the absence of a real threat of sanctions creates a restraint
vacuum that sucks litigators into temptations too great to resist. Attorneys
who are under acute time constraints, or who are saddled with weak posi-
tions, or who are vulnerable to pressures from clients, and who believe
there is little likelihood of being punished for a violation of the rules may
not have the will to forgo an opportunity to attempt to gain an advantage
through a violation. Lawyers also observed that the relative rarity of sanc-
tions permits abuses to beget additional abuses. Several litigators described
their own willingness to respond in kind after an opponent has attempted
to abuse the tools of discovery. Some attorneys also reported being
pressured by their clients to use discovery as a retaliatory weapon to harass
or burden opponents who the clients believe have used discovery tools un-
fairly. Finally, it should be noted that the remoteness of restraint by the
judiciary leaves considerable room not only for clear abuses but also for
the extensive tactical jockeying which, at least in the large cases, appears
to contribute significantly to the inefficiency of the discovery process (cite
omitted).0 9
"0'See, e.g., FED. R. Civ. P. 37(B)(2); OHIO R. Civ. P. 37(B)(2).
206See, e.g., FED. R. Civ. P. 37(D); OHIO R. Civ. P. 37(D).
2"See, e.g., FED. R. Civ. P. 11; OHio R. Civ. P. 11; Cann, Frivolous Lawsuits - The Lawyer's Duty to
Say "No," 52 U. COLO. L. REV. 367 (1981). For proposals on rule and statutory changes related to deter-
rence of dilatory motions, see Edelstein, The Ethics of Dilatory Motion Practice: Time for Change, 46
FORDHAM L. REV. 1069 (1976).
"'FED. R. App. P. 46(C).
"'gBrazil, Views from the Front Lines: Observations by Chicago Lawyers About the System of Civil
Discovery, 1980 A.B.F.RES. J. 219, 249-50. For similar recent observations, see Porter, Discovery Abuse,
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New thought should be given to the role of costs and sanctions in Ohio's
appellate courts. One appropriate way would be district by district considera-
tion of possible new local rules regarding the manner in which the current general
rules on costs and sanctions are to be employed.2" ' With such local rules, an
individual panel's discretion would be limited, a more uniform and recognized
policy would prevail, and differences in attorney practice from district to district
would be accommodated.
V. CONCLUSION
In the upcoming years the Ohio courts of appeals will need to consider,
and initiate or help to initiate, new ways of fulfilling their role as the courts
of last resort for most Ohio litigants. In doing so, consideration should
be given to changes in these courts' business and operating manners, since fur-
ther increases in judicial officers alone cannot assure satisfactory role fulfill-
ment. Judicial responses to a survey on possible reforms indicate wide differences
of opinion on areas suitable for change. Such differences, together with the
variations in legal practice in the Ohio districts and the largely inconclusive
returns shown by the studies of recent reforms in other appellate courts, in-
dicate a need for much local appellate court experimentation.
Regarding the business of the courts of appeals, serious throught should
be given to eliminating the "one trial, one review" principle in many types of
cases. With respect to the courts' operating manners, possible alterations in
the prehearing, hearing and posthearing stages merit discussion. Such altera-
tions include increased employment of prehearing conferences, promulgation
of a general rule on citation to unreported decisions and on publication of opi-
nions, restrictions on the opportunity for oral argument, elimination of the
need for written decisions in certain cases, and more use of the courts' sanc-
tioning powers.
While no panacea appears for the substantial difficulties caused by the
continually-increasing case filings in the Ohio courts of appeals, some action
is needed now. As Chief Justice Burger said when proposing consideration of
certain changes in the federal courts of appeals, "In this as in all other matters
relating to procedures, methods and practices, it is far better that we should
risk some false starts rather than make no starts at all." 2"I Hopefully, this arti-
cle will aid in the discovery of the most appropriate action to be taken, while
prompting few, if any, false starts.
17 FORUM 482, 487-88 (1981); Sherwood, Curbing Discovery Abuse, 21 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 567 (1981).
Some evidence indicates, perhaps, that times they are achanging. See, e.g., J. M. Cleminshaw v. City
of Norwich, No. 76-321, sip op. (D. Conn. Dec. 1, 1981) (court imposed a fine of $150 on an attorney for
discovery abuse). And consider pending proposals regarding changes in FED. R. Civ. P. 11, supra note207 and accompanying text. Subrin, The New Era in American Civil Procedure, 67 A.B.A.J. 1648 (1981).
I,,An illustration of an appeals court's local rule on sanctions is 8TH CIt. R 16(E), which allows imposi-
tion of $250 in costs when counsel files a frivolous petition for rehearing en banc, and which is accom-
panied by a Rule, 8TH CIR. R. 16(C), that establishes guidelines for determining which appeals are even poten-
tially suitable for a rehearing en banc. And consider the proposal in Oberman, supra note 88, at 1073.
"Burger, supra note 71, at 1127.
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APPENDIX
The following is a reproduction of the survey letters sent by the authors
to the Ohio appeals court judges:
Dear Judge
I am writing to you regarding the operation of the Ohio Court of
Appeals. I recently joined two of my students in deciding to examine briefly
the operation of the Court; should this initial review reveal areas of general
concern, we are committed to a more detailed exam whose results we hope
would appear in a published study. As part of our preliminary effort, we
are conducting an informal survey of the Court's judicial officers.
During our early investigation we have focused on several Appellate
Procedure rules and raised questions thereon, including:
1. Rule 12(A). Is the requirement of passing upon each assignment
of error in writing needlessly burdensome; and if so, should there
be a return of the option of summary disposition?
2. Rule 20. Could prehearing conferences be used more extensively;
and if so, to what ends?
3. Rule 21. Should oral argument be made discretionary with the
Court in all or some types of cases?
We have also tried to focus on areas ripe for a rulemaking effort. For
example, we have considered whether there should be a rule against cita-
tion of unreported decisions. Finally we have focused on the increasing
caseload handled by the Court of Appeals and the mechanisms developed
to cope with the additional volume. We were prompted by the recogni-
tion that case filings and terminations for the Court have more than tripl-
ed in the past fifteen years, far surpassing the increase in the number of
new judges.
We would greatly appreciate your thoughts on our undertaking to
date, together with any suggestions you wish to share regarding other possi-
ble means of improving the operation of the Ohio Court of Appeals. We
thank you in advance for your interest and assistance.
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